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Abstract 
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: Recent studies regarding war termination and the 
bargaining theory of war focus on how belligerents use coercion to reach a war settlement, but 
neglect the importance of tactical decisions. Although strategies are the principal tool used to 
conduct war, only significant tactical achievements lead to significant strategic achievements. 
METHOD: In this paper I analyze the tactics employed in two case studies, the Second Boer 
War between Great Britain and the South African Boers and the Winter War between the Soviet 
Union and Finland. Using the bargaining model of war, I discuss two categories of tactics. 
Targeted tactics focus on destroying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and dislocating their 
strengths while minimizing one’s own vulnerabilities. Nontargeted tactics focus on centers of 
gravity, employing military strength in an effort to overwhelm enemy forces with superior 
resources and technology. RESULTS: I demonstrate that tactics have a marked impact on the 
duration and outcome of warfare and targeted tactics minimize the cost of fighting in order to 
achieve strategic objectives and increase the bargaining advantage. CONCLUSION: Targeted 
tactics are a significant tool in warfare that affect war termination and hold the potential to 
increase the bargaining advantage at a lesser cost.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Military resources are essential to achieve military success and a state with greater 
military power than its opponent has greater opportunity to achieve its military objectives. 
However, history demonstrates that superior military strength does not guarantee victory. 
Numerous weaker states have beaten larger opponents in warfare; the Revolutionary War, the 
Six-Day War, and the Russo-Japanese War are all examples that show military means are not 
always as important as military methods. Although war outcomes depend on a multitude of 
factors, efficient strategies and tactics have the potential to mitigate the disadvantages posed by 
fewer technological and numerical resources. This renders the possession of resources less 
important than the use of those resources. The bargaining model of war demonstrates that 
warfare is both rational and costly, but depending on war strategies and tactics, conflict does not 
necessarily require massive destruction to create an advantageous outcome. Though effective 
warfare can employ resources to achieve a political goal, efficient warfare can achieve that 
political goal with less material and political capital. 
Although most political theory notes the significance of military strategies, very little 
scholarly literature has been devoted to the impact of tactical decisions. One of the most 
prominent military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz, said, “We maintain therefore that only great 
tactical successes can lead to great strategic ones; or as we have already said more specifically, 
tactical successes are of paramount importance in war.”1 Although tactics are customarily 
viewed as a tool to implement strategy, tactics themselves hold variable opportunity to affect 
efficient warfare. Studies of efficient warfare are incomplete without studies of the impact of 
                                                
1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 228. 
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tactical decisions. Furthermore, tactics achieve battlefield objectives with varying resource 
requirements and personnel costs. In this thesis I classify tactics as falling into one of two 
categories: targeted tactics which concentrate resources on destroying the enemy’s critical 
vulnerabilities and minimizing their own vulnerabilities, and nontargeted tactics which employ 
military might to overwhelm the enemy and destroy the entire enemy force. In this thesis I will 
demonstrate how tactical decisions affect war outcomes and that targeted tactics specifically 
decrease the cost of increasing the bargaining advantage in war. 
This research is intended to fill a gap in war termination literature that tries to explain war 
outcomes without studying the effects of tactics. Not only do tactical decisions have a distinct 
impact on warfare, but certain tactical decisions also support certain types of war outcomes. 
While tactics have been employed successfully and unsuccessfully in warfare for millennia, the 
scholarly literature on war termination has thus far not recognized the power of tactics in the 
bargaining model of war. Theoretical interpretations of warfare are incomplete without 
discussions of tactics and military planners seeking efficiency would do well to understand the 
theoretical principles that lead to attaining objectives with fewer resources. This analysis of 
targeted and nontargeted tactics presents the role of tactics in resource employment and 
demonstrates that targeted tactics follow principles that use resources effectively and 
economically to attain military objectives.  
After addressing definitions of some military terminology, I present a literature review of 
the foundational theories necessary to understanding the role of tactics in warfare. This centers 
on the bargaining model and how the commitment and information problem lead to conflict 
initiation and are solved through warfare. I then apply this framework to a discussion of my two 
categories of tactics and what makes them significant to war outcomes. Following this theory 
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discussion, I will present two case studies that demonstrate the concepts in this section. The 
Second Boer War demonstrates how the British, with superior resources and strategy, were 
nearly routed by the Boers predominantly because of their targeted tactics. The Winter War 
similarly illustrates how the small Finnish Army used targeted tactics to destroy massive 
amounts of Soviet resources to save the integrity of Finnish sovereignty. 
Tactics, operations, and strategies are distinct levels of military activity that can blur 
together but are important to distinguish in this discussion of targeted tactics. Clausewitz defined 
the three in relation to one another, using the term “engagement” instead of “operation.” Tactics 
are “the use of armed forces in an engagement,” an engagement is “a distinct activity of combat 
in war” and strategy is “the use of engagements for the object of war.”2 In addition, the United 
States Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines the tactical 
level of war as “the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.” The operational level of war 
is “the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and 
sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.” Lastly, the 
strategic level of war is “the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of 
nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives 
and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives.”3  
 
  
                                                
2 Clausewitz, On War, 90, 95, 128. 
3 United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2016, 
176, 227, 234, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Tactics are one piece of a complex system of warfare. In a bargaining framework, war is 
understood as a means of communication, a negotiating process that describes how war starts 
and how actions on the battlefield lead to war outcomes. This literature review covers the 
bargaining model of war and how it applies to war termination and key military strategies. These 
theories create a framework to understand how tactical decisions practically affect theoretical 
explanations of war outcomes. 
 
 Bargaining Model of War 
War is always inefficient after the fact. The cost of a war outcome is less costly than that 
war outcome in addition to the cost of war. Belligerents would benefit from reaching a settlement 
without the destruction of warfare, but belligerents still initiate conflict in order to produce a 
political settlement.4 The bargaining model of war explains how rational actors initiate and 
conduct warfare in order to reach an acceptable war outcome. Warfare is a system of bargaining 
that is an extension of diplomatic negotiations onto the battlefield. Warfare plays an important 
role in negotiating after a breakdown in communications, often caused by either the information 
problem or the commitment problem. These two issues are central to why states rationally 
initiate costly wars.  
The information problem occurs when states hide and misrepresent information on their 
capabilities and intentions in order to promote and protect their interests. Kenneth Waltz, James 
Fearon, Geoffrey Blainey, and Robert Powell explained how this causes other states to form 
rational, but ignorant, conclusions with the available information. If this miscalculation involves 
                                                
4 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 39 (1995): 379-414. 
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states’ relative power and willingness to fight, rational actions and rational responses can 
provoke war where neither state originally intended to initiate war. 5 For example, before the Six-
Day War Gamal Abdel Nasser expected his buildup of military forces on Egypt’s border with 
Israel to deter Israeli aggression and enhance his support among Arab nations. Instead, his 
actions led to a preemptive air strike that preceded Israel’s swift victory and accumulation of 
previously Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territory. In addition, Alistair Smith and Allan Stam 
say states interpret, value, and utilize information distinctly, creating further room for rational, 
yet incorrect, conclusions about other states.6 The information problem due to lack of 
information, misinformation, and misinterpretations, can create false conclusions that 
unintentionally lead to war. 
Commitment problems occur because actors cannot know with certainty what another 
actor will or will not do in the future. Even with full information, a state cannot guarantee 
another state’s actions and credibly commit to an agreement. Both Fearon and Powell explored 
how self-interest and lack of trust exacerbate this uncertainty. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates 
this inefficiency. If states collaborate, they may all gain an advantage. However, if a state agrees 
to collaborate and then acts outside the agreement, that state may gain an advantage over the 
others and leave them worse off. In order to insulate themselves from this possibility, states 
instead choose to act alone because they cannot trust other states to cooperate even if all would 
benefit from mutual collaboration. In John Herz’s “security dilemma,” states all increase their 
military capabilities to counter their growing insecurity due to others’ increased military 
                                                
5 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973), 143-45; Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for 
War,” 381; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 116; Kenneth 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 165. 
6 Blainey, The Causes of War, 143-45; Alistair Smith and Allan C. Stam, “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 no. 6, (2004), 810-11. 
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capabilities.7 Commitment problems also exist in international agreements. Competing 
agreements provide incentives to agree to or renege on individually advantageous situations that 
altogether destabilize international relations. This also occurs as relative power shifts and states 
alter agreements for their own interest but to the detriment of international security.8 For 
example, states held multiple international agreements preceding World War I and shifted their 
alliances to either bandwagon or balance against other powers. Although perhaps individually 
advantageous, these alliances created an unstable international system. Barring international 
commitments, the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand would not have spurred such a significant 
conflict. Instead, these commitments compelled states to fight one another. 
Even when a state desires to convey accurate information, commitment issues mar 
otherwise trustworthy communication. Thomas Schelling and Branislav Slantchev discussed how 
this is particularly true when states seek to issue warnings; a threat is only as powerful as it is 
believable. In order to convince others that a threat is credible, the state offers a costly signal. 
This costly signal is a gesture to demonstrate the state’s commitment to its statement; the costlier 
the signal, the stronger the validation of commitment. This means states may take action in a 
minor situation in order to establish effective deterrence against a more significant situation. 
Although normally the state may not engage in violence, that action is useful as a costly signal to 
forestall greater future violence.9   
  
                                                
7 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 186. 
8 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 401-06; Powell, In the Shadow of Power, 1, 7, 9. 
9 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 36; Branislav Slantchev, 
Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
29, 61, 93.  
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 Coercive Negotiations  
The bargaining model shows that states cannot always reliably communicate 
diplomatically due to information and commitment problems, so in order to reach a settlement, 
states use a more credible method of communicating: warfare. Military outcomes are far more 
difficult to manipulate than information about resources or intentions. Dan Reiter, Stam and 
Smith, and Fearon discussed how combat successes and defeats are a series of coercive 
negotiations used to reach a settlement. Military victories provide bargaining power over the 
loser until the victor has enough power to force a settlement.10 Slantchev called this process the 
Principle of Convergence; warfare coordinates belligerents’ expectations until they agree upon 
an outcome. War loses its utility when communication about belligerents’ intentions and 
capabilities is no longer uncertain and combat ceases to provide new information.11  
Slantchev asserts that effective bargaining does not necessarily require the power to win 
military victories but the ability to tolerate damage to their self and impose costs on their enemy. 
A belligerent will continue fighting as long as they believe they can earn a better bargaining 
position by inflicting further damage on the opponent and also withstand more damage 
themselves. In asymmetric warfare, though a weak state may not gain military victories, it can 
still impose costs on a strong state and gain a better bargaining position and more advantageous 
                                                
10 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 400; Smith and Stam, “Bargaining and the Nature of War;” Dan 
Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Branislav Slantchev, The Principle of 
Convergence in Wartime Negotiations, American Political Science Review 47 no. 4, (2003), 622; R. Harrison 
Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science 44 no.3, (2004): 469. 
11 Branislav Slantchev, “The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States,” The American 
Political Science Review 97 no. 1, (2003), 130-31; Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime 
Negotiations,” 622. 
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outcome than it would without fighting.12 In addition, the bargaining model shows that a state’s 
ability to impose and bear costs is not necessarily correlated to its physical capabilities. Patricia 
Sullivan characterizes war as a function of cost versus the worth of the objective; a belligerent’s 
strength of will and the value of its war aims determine its ability to tolerate the cost of war. 
Once the cost rises above its tolerance, the state values an end to hostilities over the objective.13 
Norway provides example of a state’s tolerance of costs exceeding its will to fight. Norway was 
one of 22 countries contributing to a coalition of forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, by 
2005 Norway had suffered 10 casualties and domestic political pressure grew to withdraw. 
Although Norway’s military capabilities were not threatened by the loss of 10 soldiers, the cost 
was greater than the worth of continued operations. Once a belligerent can no longer stand the 
costs or realizes it can no longer damage the enemy enough to improve its negotiating advantage, 
ending hostilities is in its best interest before the enemy imposes additional loss, gains a 
bargaining advantage, and dictates the terms of peace.14 In other words, once a belligerent loses 
its ability to hurt the enemy or sustain further costs, it loses its ability to improve its bargaining 
position, and combat loses its profitability. 
Carl von Clausewitz pinpoints the importance of perception in wartime bargaining; if a 
belligerent believes they will fail in future combat and fear their destruction more than the 
possibility of success, they will negotiate end terms. Schelling builds on the importance of 
perception, explaining that the results in warfare are achieved not through the violence already 
                                                
12 Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” 621, 627. 
13 Patricia Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51 no. 3, (2007), 496, 501; Patricia Sullivan, Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in 
Armed Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 13. 
14 H.A. Callahan, What Makes a War End? (New York: Vanguard Press, 1944), 251. 
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inflicted, but the violence a belligerent fears in the future.15 Similar to costly signals before 
hostilities, during war belligerents communicate their future intentions and ability to continue 
hurting an opponent through existing violence in order to deter continued hostilities.  
 
 Theories on War Termination 
The bargaining model of war is a process of information sharing until belligerents reach 
an agreement on the expected outcome. Three possibilities lead to the end of a conflict: the 
attacker achieves their goal, the defender ceases defending, or the attacker ceases to seek their 
goal. Gay Hammerman and Reiter both note that this rarely is achieved through total victory; an 
armed force is rarely destroyed to the point that it cannot physically engage in continued combat. 
Instead, belligerents cease fighting because the cost exceeds the value of the goal or the victor 
has enough bargaining power to force an advantageous settlement.16 A decisive military victory 
allows the victor to determine most terms; although treaties don’t always last, H. A. Callahan 
notes they create a means to halt hostilities and provide the victor their spoils and Reiter and 
Clausewitz recognize that most states assume treaties will be eventually broken.17  
However, the most important part of warfare and the key to a proper settlement is 
meeting the political goals of the conflict. As Clausewitz so famously dictated, war is politics by 
other means. Michael Handel, Liddell Hart, and Roy Pinette strongly agree: the purpose of any 
                                                
15 Clausewitz, On War, 91, 92; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 136. 
16 Clausewitz, On War, 92; Gay M. Hammerman, Conventional Attrition and Battle Termination Criteria: A Study 
of War Termination: Technical Report (Dunn Loring, Va: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 1982), 
3-4; Reiter, How Wars End, 25-34; Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” 629; 
Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” 501.  
17 Callahan, What Makes a War End?, 219-220; Clausewitz, On War, 80; Reiter, How Wars End, 24; Smith and 
Stam, “Bargaining and the Nature of War,” 787. 
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war is to attain the political object. The bargaining model demonstrates how political 
negotiations continue onto the battlefield to reach a political settlement. Tactical military 
successes do not necessarily indicate political successes if the following settlement does not 
properly address the policy. True war termination does not automatically follow a decisive 
military victory unless the ensuing negotiations meet the political objectives.18 
 
 The Effects of Strategy on War Outcomes 
Military strategies usually focus on one of two types of military targets, either a center of 
gravity or a critical vulnerability. Centers of gravity are points of a military’s strength and critical 
vulnerabilities are points of a military’s weakness. These two types of target affect wartime 
bargaining differently; Clausewitz and John Warden both identify the center of gravity as the 
most important type of target since it is the source of an enemy’s strength and will have a large 
impact. If destroyed, the bargaining advantage shifts considerably. However, Stephen Biddle, 
Robert Leonard, and Hart point to critical vulnerabilities as the most effective target. Though not 
a source of strength, if these points are disrupted, such as communication links or logistical 
support systems, they render an enemy’s strength irrelevant. Exploiting these vulnerabilities can 
assist a fast and relatively cheap victory due to critical vulnerabilities’ compounding effects on 
military capabilities, which Warden stresses as key. The goal is to weaken the enemy until they 
surrender without the necessity of destroying their entire force. As Carla Martinez Machain 
                                                
18 Clausewitz, On War, 87, 177; Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank 
Cass & Co, 1996), xiiv, xv; Liddell BH. Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New York: Praeger, 1962), 351; 
Linda Legier-Topp, “War Termination: Setting Conditions for Peace,” (MA thesis, US Army War College, 2009); 
Roy R. Pinette, Operational Considerations for War Termination (Newport: Naval War College, 1994), 20; Dan 
Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003), 27.  
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points out, concentration of a belligerent’s strength against their enemy’s weakness has an added 
benefit of disorganizing enemy forces.19  
Military strategies tend to fall in one of three commonly used categories and hold distinct 
characteristics that determine their efficacy and efficiency. Choosing an appropriate strategy is 
integral to successful wartime bargaining and reaching an advantageous settlement. The 
categories, as delineated by Reiter and Curtis Meek, are attrition, punishment, and maneuver, 
which offer distinct methods of achieving political goals and war termination. No strategy is 
always best to achieve this result; each conflict offers distinct constraints and opportunities, 
centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, as well as varying materiel costs, humanitarian 
losses, length, and emotional impact.20  
Wars of attrition are characterized by wearing down an enemy force over time, a contest 
of physical and mental endurance, not necessarily strength. Attrition tends to manifest in 
continuous losses of resources and soldiers, often through large confrontations as a belligerent 
increases the cost to the enemy. This tends to be more destructive than acquisitive, such as the 
Allies destroying Germany’s military in World War I without desiring German territory. 
                                                
19 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 2-3; Clausewitz, On War, 485; Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 34, 371; Robert R. 
Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 
20-21, 24, 73-74; Carla Martinez Machain, "Air Campaign Duration and the Interaction of Air and Ground 
Forces," International Interactions 41, no. 3 (2015), 544; Joe Strange and Marine Corps University, Centers of 
Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation so That We Can All Speak the Same 
Language, 2nd ed. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 1996); John A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning 
for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 9-11.   
20 Dan Reiter and Curtis Meek, “Determinants of Military Strategy 1903-1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test,” 
International Studies Quarterly 43 no. 2, (1999): 364; Scott D. Bennet and Allan C. Stam, “The Duration of 
Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 2 (1996): 239-257; David R. Stone, 
“Misreading Svechin: Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism,” Military History 76 (2012): 673-93. 
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Attrition usually takes time to exhaust the enemy, which Clausewitz identifies as an advantage 
for weak states to build their forces, but Callahan notes can also be a disadvantage if the 
belligerent has too little time to keep up with its losses or its enemy has enough time to 
continually build its own forces.21 
Punishment strategies also seek to increase the cost on the enemy, but by wearing down 
the resolve of a population, not their military capability. Similar to attrition, these strategies tend 
to take time, but target civilians and their way of life in the hope that a belligerent’s government 
will suffer political defeat or significant public pressure and end the war. Engaging the enemy 
force is not a necessity. Punishment strategies work best when the enemy stakes or resolve to 
attain the political aim are low. However, punishment strategies can also backfire when the 
population is highly loyal to the state, as in many democracies, and humanitarian losses instead 
increase resolve, such as British determination in the face of the German Blitz of night bombings 
on English cities during World War II.22 
Maneuver strategies use the movement of a belligerent’s forces to destroy the enemy’s 
ability to fight effectively; the goal is not to destroy but to neutralize strength. Effective 
maneuver strategies require a belligerent to identify an enemy’s strength as well as identifying 
                                                
21 Scott D. Bennett and Allan C. Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3, (1998): 354; Bennet and Stam, “The Duration of 
Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” 240-41; Callahan, What Makes a War End?, 231; Clausewitz, On War, 33-34, 93; 
Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, trans. Walter J. Renfroe Jr 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985); Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand 
Battle, 19; John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 30; Schelling, 
Arms and Influence, 15. 
22 Bennett and Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy A Combined Model of War Outcomes and 
Duration," 354-55; Bennet and Stam, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” 240-41; Robert A. Pape, 
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 7, 13-14, 21-22, 38. 
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their critical vulnerabilities. Leonard and Hart explain how dislocation and disruption of the 
enemy’s center of gravity can render it irrelevant by moving the decisive point of a battle, such 
as attacking the enemy at the rear of their forces, or drawing the enemy away through a feint. 
Technology can also functionally dislocate enemy strengths; most military technology is 
continually evolving to functionally dislocate hostile technologies, such as IEDs spurring the 
development of armored vehicles that could withstand their blast.23 The India-Pakistan War of 
1971 displays the Indian use of maneuver strategies to flank Pakistani outposts on the 
Bangladeshi border, avoiding their centers of gravity. Indian forces attacked their critical 
vulnerabilities, cutting communications and supply lines, as well as pitting Indian forces against 
the weak rear of Pakistani strongholds.24  
 
 Conclusion 
The literature relevant to discussing tactical efficiency begins with an understanding of 
the bargaining model and how the information and commitment problem allow for rational war 
initiation. Combat victories and defeats allow belligerents to communicate their intent until their 
expectations converge, leading to a negotiated settlement and the end of hostilities. The strategy 
belligerents choose for coercive negotiations is an important factor in their success 
communicating their intent and strength of will to the opponent. An appropriate strategy helps 
lead to profitable war termination. However, even if the perfect strategy is selected to achieve 
                                                
23 Bennett and Stam, "The Declining Advantages of Democracy A Combined Model of War Outcomes and 
Duration," 354; Bennet and Stam, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” 240-41; Clausewitz, On War, 93, 
485; Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 339-41; Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory 
and AirLand Battle, 19-21, 63, 66-67. 
24 Robert M. Citno, “Operational Success and Failure: The lndo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the Iran-Iraq War,” In 
Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 187-212 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). 
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political objectives, adequate tactics are necessary to conduct successful warfare. The roles of 
tactical decisions and efficacy in the bargaining model will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
  
 15 
Chapter 3 - Targeted and Nontargeted Tactics 
 Although the international political structure is a complicated system, I hold to several 
assumptions largely agreed upon by the scholarly community. States are the primary actor in 
international affairs, the international order is anarchic, states cannot make binding commitments 
to one another since their intentions are always uncertain and their relative power subject to 
change, and lastly, states are unitary, rational actors.25 States are not always aware of their own 
capacity and strength of will, however, nor always able to accurately calculate the cost of their 
actions. In addition, states contain complicated internal affairs that affect what political goals are 
most important and how they are pursued. This does not affect how states act, but indicates 
complexities in rational decision-making.26 
 
 Theories on Tactics 
Although Kenneth Waltz asserted that military resources determine the power balance 
between states as well as the outcomes of conflicts,27 resource employment also has a significant 
effect on war outcomes. Just as different strategies work more efficiently in different contexts 
and lead to faster war termination, tactics can similarly make or break strategic decisions. 
Clausewitz identifies tactics as the foundation of strategy; successful tactics best support 
successful strategies and lead to successful military engagements. The two influence each other 
and merge together in ways that sometimes make them hard to distinguish. However, Clausewitz 
                                                
25 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 379-414; Hammerman, Conventional Attrition and Battle 
Termination Criteria: A Study of War Termination: Technical Report, 12; Reiter, How Wars End; Slantchev, “The 
Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” 621-632. 
26 Michael Handel, “War Termination,” Journal of Strategic Studies 1(1978): 72. 
27 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 102?. 
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was also careful to point out that strategy is more important to successful war termination than 
tactics. The Second Boer War demonstrates how a superior British strategy, in addition to 
abundant British resources, overwhelmed the Boer’s clever maneuver and marksmanship.28  
Nevertheless, tactics are vital determinants in the efficacy of strategy. For example,; 
punishment strategies rely in large part on humanitarian losses leading to a political surrender, 
which requires tactics that kill, especially those that kill a large number of civilians quickly and 
cheaply. Conversely, any defensive strategy benefits from tactics that prevent heavy casualties, 
such as using hills to hide from an enemy. In maneuver strategies, belligerents seek methods to 
disrupt an enemy force instead of just kill its soldiers; tactics that confuse and scatter 
organization would effectively bolster a strategy to cause a surrender with less combat; in this 
case, a stun grenade could be more effective than an explosion.29 Furthermore, planned strategies 
are not always performed as intended. Actual tactics on the battlefield must meet unforeseen 
challenges and adapt to new situations. For example the Soviets in the Winter War planned a 
blitzkrieg strategy of maneuver but were forced into a war of attrition due to Finnish geography, 
strategy, and tactics.30 Even if a strategy is perfectly crafted to meet the expected conflict, 
competent tactics are essential for effective adaptation. 
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 Two Typologies: Targeted and Nontargeted 
Critical vulnerabilities create opportunities for military actions that have compounding 
effects beyond the value of the target. While effective tactics solve problems with whatever 
resources are necessary, efficient tactics solve problems with as few resources as necessary. 
Critical vulnerabilities offer prospects for adept resource allocation and engagement, efficiently 
increasing the bargaining advantage at a lesser cost. Taking advantage of those opportunities 
requires appropriate tactical decisions. If a soldier faces several tanks on the other side of a 
bridged river, that soldier could target the individual tanks, or the soldier could target the bridge. 
Both tactics are effective at stopping the tanks, but targeting the bridge has a multiplicative effect 
at a lesser cost. The objective is not to completely destroy an opponent’s strength, but render it 
irrelevant.31 This efficiency is based on a desire to incur as little cost as necessary to inflict 
compounding costs on the enemy and gain a superior bargaining position.  
In tactical decisions, a few principles consistently lead to less costly tactics that 
contribute to military successes, and create the basis for the two typologies of tactics that I 
present in this project: targeted and nontargeted. Targeted tactics focus on destroying the 
enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and dislocating their strengths while minimizing one’s own 
vulnerabilities. They disrupt enemy power to increase the bargaining advantage. Nontargeted 
tactics, however, focus on centers of gravity, employing military strength in an effort to 
overwhelm enemy forces with superior resources and technology. 
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These two categories are derived from Martinez Machain’s categorization of aerial 
strategies as targeted and nontargeted32, which in turn is derived from Stephen Biddle’s modern 
and nonmodern tactics. Biddle asserts that military technology has become increasingly lethal 
which provokes tactics that reduce vulnerabilities to those lethal weapons. These modern tactics 
undermine the effects of advanced technology. Modern tactics are not matched to a certain time 
period but are characterized by “cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit 
independent maneuver, and combined arms.”33 Militaries that cannot tactically overcome 
technological change then employ nonmodern tactics, exposing their forces to the full advantage 
of the enemy’s technological development.34 As Martinez Machain also notes, this typology 
holds important principles beyond just the role of technology. If critical vulnerabilities are 
potentially more effective targets than centers of gravity, then not only should technology be 
employed to exploit those weaknesses, but also every other military asset. Biddle largely ignores 
other types of military power outside of technology and concentrates on the strategic level of 
employing tactics instead of the principles of tactics themselves.35 This is why targeted and 
nontargeted tactics are distinct and important; targeted tactics not only seek to negate the effects 
of technology, but also destroy their critical vulnerabilities and disrupt the enemy’s strengths. 
This is a more comprehensive set of objectives that goes beyond the role of technology to guide 
tactical decision-making compared to Biddle’s modern and nonmodern typologies.  
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However, targeted and nontargeted tactics are built on the foundation that Biddle created 
for a reason; technology plays a colossal role in tactical advantages. While the principles behind 
targeted tactics are useful no matter the technological age, advances in accuracy, firepower, and 
range augment the potential of targeted tactics. Technology creates opportunity to both protect 
vulnerabilities that were impossible to protect before as well as assault critical vulnerabilities that 
were impossible to attack earlier. An officer sitting on a horse in the back of a formation of 
troops may have been safe from an arrow, but a sniper-rifle renders the officer’s position 
suicidal. Precision-guided munitions can destroy strategic targets that were previously 
unreachable as well as cause destruction over wider areas of space more quickly, cheaply, and 
completely. As Biddle mentioned about his modern tactics, technology also creates the 
opportunity for increased use of combined arms. This tactical choice combines the strengths and 
weaknesses of weapons to reduce vulnerabilities and increase flexibility.36 Technology has also 
created new critical vulnerabilities; electromagnetic pulses are dangerous to military operations 
because of modern reliance on electricity, but an electric surge, without any accompanying 
destructive components, would have been useless in the Napoleonic era.  
Although targeted tactics are directly related to strategy, they remain on distinct 
operational levels. Strategies focus on winning the war and political objective; tactics instead 
focus on how armed forces are employed in order to win an operation. Tactics are also not 
contingent on a specific strategy; though targeted tactics employ many of the principles that 
guide maneuver strategy, targeted tactics can be used in any strategy. Conversely, a targeted 
tactic in one context may not be targeted in another. A targeted tactic supporting a punishment 
strategy, such as a precision bomb on a civilian center, may not support the strategic goals of a 
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maneuver strategy when that precision bomb would be far more effective on a communications 
hub. 
This chart provides examples of targeted and nontargeted tactics in all three types of 
military strategy:  
 
Table 1 Examples of Targeted and Nontargeted Tactics 
 
 
Targeted Nontargeted 
Attrition   
Fire weapons specifically 
at officers 
Fire weapons in order to 
kill as many enemy 
soldiers as possible 
Maneuver 
Attack multiple flanking 
positions in a formation of 
troops 
Attack the most 
concentrated point of a 
formation of troops 
Punishment 
Target transportation and 
economic centers to 
destroy a way of life 
Deploy large numbers of 
bombs to create 
widespread destruction and 
instill fear 
 
 
As this chart demonstrates, targeted tactics rely on specific employment of resources 
more than possession of greater resources. If force employment can render new technologies or 
amount of resources insignificant, materiel need not guarantee military success. A weaker force 
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can still effectively engage a stronger enemy with targeted tactics that mitigate their 
disadvantages.37 
Nontargeted tactics are more effective with superior resources and better technology. 
Sometimes strategic goals require overwhelming military force, which may benefit from 
nontargeted tactics. Nontargeted tactics have the advantage of focusing the brunt of military 
power on a center of gravity in order to produce a significant result. For example, storming the 
beaches of Normandy in World War II was a highly nontargeted Allied attack. This operation 
was also an extremely important strategic engagement and although thousands died, the attack 
was effective and key to an Allied victory in the war. Targeted tactics focus on increasing the 
bargaining advantage at a lesser cost, but that is not always the most important objective in 
warfare. Nontargeted tactics may deliver a thorough victory that leads to a bargaining advantage 
that is worth a higher cost. Targeted tactics are not the only or best means to an advantageous 
war outcome. Warfare is a complex series of events and tactical decisions do not always 
determine the result of an engagement or even an entire war. However, if military planners have 
the option to use resources to destroy enemy critical vulnerabilities while protecting their own 
forces, targeted tactical decisions can produce a far less costly result. 
However, military planners are often constrained by their available resources, which may 
seem to dictate the type of tactics used. Commanders may not have the option to use numerical 
and technological resources to launch an effective nontargeted attack. Instead, they may feel 
forced to launch smaller ambushes on an enemy force to disrupt them because destroying the 
enemy is not feasible. Although tactical decisions may be a consequence of the resources at the 
commander’s disposal, those tactics are still a choice to use resources in the most effective way 
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in that situation. Targeted tactics are effective not because of the resources available but because 
of how those resources are used. Possessing fewer resources may make targeted tactics the most 
feasible use of resources, but possessing substantial resources may still leave targeted tactics as 
an effective option. For example, in the India-Pakistan War of 1971, India had the option to 
bring their massive resources in a nontargeted assault against Pakistani strongholds in 
Bangladesh. Instead, they chose to use targeted tactics to disrupt communications and supply 
lines and fragment Pakistan’s military.  
This theoretical analysis of the role of tactics demonstrates that tactical decisions affect 
war outcomes and that targeted tactics lessen the cost of increasing the bargaining advantage. 
The Second Boer War and the Winter War are excellent case studies to display targeted tactics in 
history. The Second Boer War is an impressive example of how a few targeted tactics can 
produce repeated advantages over a numerically and materially superior belligerent. The Boers’ 
targeted tactics became a significant advantage with the new technologies, such as smokeless 
powder, machine guns, and automatic light artillery.38 In the Winter War, the most significant 
technological asset was the Soviet tank, but the Finns demonstrated how targeted tactics, as well 
as an economical use of Molotov Cocktails, could significantly decrease the enemy’s advantage. 
These cases both demonstrate how technology can augment the effect of targeted tactics, but that 
advanced technology does not create targeted tactics. The Boers and the Finns both capitalize on 
methods to destroy their enemy’s ability to fight by taking advantage of the enemy’s weaknesses. 
They both employ small, mobile forces to assault large enemy forces, targeting their officers, and 
wear down the enemy’s strength in numbers. These cases clearly illustrate the potential of 
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targeted tactics in situations where superior resources did not create a swift and easy victory 
against a weaker force. 
Although many scholars have neglected the significance of tactical decisions, they are 
significant to war outcomes. Tactics are an important factor in the success of strategic goals. 
Furthermore, targeted tactics create the opportunity to destroy the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities 
and dislocate enemy strengths while minimizing one’s own vulnerabilities. They disrupt enemy 
power in order for belligerents to increase their bargaining advantage at a lesser cost. Targeted 
tactics are a valuable tool that provides belligerents the opportunity to attain their military 
objectives more efficiently. 
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Chapter 4 - The Second Boer War: 1899-1902 
Figure 1 Map of the Second Boer War 
39 
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If overwhelming military power guaranteed short and successful warfare, the Boer War 
would have ended within months and the Boers would have quickly accepted their imminent 
defeat, just as the British initially expected. Few in the British government believed that the 
Boers and the tactics they employed would be as dangerous as they proved,40 especially relative 
to the impressive power of the British military. Although British military might gained a victory 
in the end, the Boers’ targeted tactics imposed severe casualties on exposed British troops and 
forced the British to begin using targeted tactics to reduce their own critical vulnerabilities and 
target the Boers’ critical vulnerabilities. The major battles of the Boer War, notably the siege of 
Ladysmith and the Battle of Colenso, showcase this British shift from nontargeted tactics during 
the first phase of the war from 1899 – 1900 to increasingly targeted tactics in the second and 
third phases from 1900 – 1902. Analysis of various tactics, the casualties inflicted, and the goals 
of the battle will demonstrate that targeted tactics were more effective at achieving goals and 
ending battles than nontargeted tactics. 
 
 Before the War: Military Preparedness 
The British army was underprepared for a war against an enemy they underestimated 
when the Second Boer War commenced in 1899. The British aimed to annex the Dutch colonies 
of Transvaal and the Orange Free State, which neighbored the British colonies of Natal and Cape 
Colony. Since some in the British Parliament thought the Boers were an insignificant threat, they 
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felt little need to prepare for an upcoming military conflict. Instead, they fought to keep British 
forces at a minimum in South Africa to avoid provoking the Boers prematurely. In addition to 
antiquated military training, this overconfidence in British prowess proved a deadly mistake in 
the ensuing war.41 The British maintained a force of 30,000 troops in Natal and Cape Colony,42 
10,000 of which had only recently arrived from India, exhausted from their travel. The rest of the 
troops were scattered around the two colonies or one of several garrisons; the troops had neither 
satisfactory maps nor an adequate understanding of the terrain. 43 
At the turn of the 18th century, military weaponry consisted of rifles, machine guns, and 
field artillery. Smokeless powder rifles, invented in 1886, eliminated the puff of smoke emitted 
with every shot as well as increased the range of and velocity of bullets. Machine guns were also 
a fairly new invention and increased the potential firepower of a smaller force. These were 
single-barrel, belt-fed weapons such as the Vickers-Maxim. Automatic light field artillery was 
also first used in the Second Boer War; the “Pom-Pom” used a continuous stream of fire instead 
of issuing a flash that indicated soldiers should take cover before the shell landed, and some 
long-range artillery, such as the “Long Tom,” could reach 11,000 yards.44 
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The British had few mobile heavy artillery units, supplies, or mounted soldiers. Their 
totals amounted to 174 guns, 6,350 cavalry, and 42,700 infantry, most of whom were unfamiliar 
with the African terrain. The British required thousands of reinforcements to make up for these 
deficiencies, which only arrived after a full year of warfare.45 Furthermore, in the face of 
significant military defeats, British commanders struggled to ascertain effective strategies and 
tactics to achieve absolute victory. The British strategy, put in place by General Sir Redvers 
Buller (1839-1908)46 began with an invasion of the Orange Free State. Once the army captured 
the capital of Bloemfontein, the British would force a surrender and annex the Orange Free State, 
and eventually, the Transvaal as well.47  
Conversely, the Boers were on a constant war footing; they had a superior understanding 
of African terrain, were well supplied, and employed tactics that utilized Boer strengths. Every 
man between the age of sixteen and sixty was required to be ready for war with ten days’ rations, 
a pony, a rifle, and thirty pounds of ammunition.48 These measures enabled the Boer fighting 
force to number around 40,000 at the start of the war, nearly all of whom were mounted on 
horses accustomed to the African climate. This gave the Boers the advantage of great mobility 
and speed.49 In addition, the Boers were exceptionally well trained with their rifles; they were 
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exceptionally lethal and had the ability to target British officers who were usually mounted on 
white horses with distinct uniforms.50 Boer leadership was also highly decentralized, which gave 
Boer commanders the freedom to make military decisions based on present events instead of 
waiting on the chain of command. This independence served as an asset to Boer mobility and 
quick decision-making, but also inhibited implementation of their overarching strategy.51 The 
Boers planned to invade Natal and take the Harbor of Durban to block the British from invading 
the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and eventually, force a British retreat.52 
 
 Phase One, October 1899 – January 1900: Boers Victorious 
The first phase of the Boer War from 12 October 1899 to 10 January 1900 put the British 
immediately on the defensive and demonstrated the inferiority of traditional British massed line 
assaults against the targeted tactics of the Boers. Exposed British troops primarily relied on 
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coverage from British artillery, which at this point was not especially accurate or deadly.53 
Conversely, the Boers utilized concealing terrain and dispersed troops to reduce their 
vulnerabilities as well as provide more positions to shoot at the British. 
The first engagement of the war, a perfect example of British nontargeted tactics, 
occurred on 19 October 1899 at Talana Hill, ending in a costly British victory. The invading 
Boers moved toward the British towns of Glencoe and Dundee in northern Natal, west of the 
Orange Free State. Four thousand British troops were stationed in a valley between the two 
towns for their protection. However, the hills made this position difficult to defend and gave the 
Boers a strategic advantage. The Boers took Talana Hill by stealth in the middle of the night, 
surprising the British with a shell attack from above. The British responded with a frontal 
infantry assault and only retook the hill after losing hundreds of soldiers. The cavalry did not 
play a key role and only helped secure the British position and captured a few prisoners after the 
bulk of the engagement was over. British casualties totaled around 500 men whereas the Boers 
only lost around 200.54 Although technically this engagement ended in a British triumph, it 
resulted in heavy losses to protect strategically minor towns that the British abandoned soon 
thereafter. When the Boers took Talana Hill, the British responded with a fatal nontargeted attack 
by forming a massed line of troops with no geographic cover to conduct a frontal assault in order 
to retake the Hill. If the British had attacked Talana Hill from multiple directions or used their 
cavalry which could climb the hill more quickly, they would have reduced their exposure by 
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becoming a much harder target for Boer shells and potentially retaken the hill with fewer loses.55 
Instead, the result was a messy engagement that resulted in high British casualties for an 
insignificant victory.  
The next engagement at Elandslaagte Station on 21 October 1899 proceeded similarly to 
Talana Hill with an artillery duel, infantry frontal assault, and a cavalry pursuit to obtain 
prisoners and secure the position, but included a few targeted improvements.56 One of the most 
important improvements were khaki uniforms, first worn in India in the 1800s, that slowly 
spread throughout the British military. They became the standard for foreign operations during 
the Boer War, where they were highly effective as camouflage compared to traditional red 
coats.57 Exchanging uniforms helped the British capture the Elandslaagte supply train station 
with around 5,000 soldiers who presented a much less obvious target to accurate Boer fire. They 
began with a frontal attack combined with two flanking assaults against 2,000 Boers, positioned 
on a hill near the station. The flanking positions spread out British forces to mitigate troop 
exposure, a targeted tactic. However, the British had no natural cover and relied solely on 
artillery cover. The Boers exchanged artillery fire with the British until the British led a 
nontargeted bayonet charge to seize the hill. British reinforcements comprised of a field battery 
and several squadrons, numbering two and a half battalions total, with 550 gunners and eighteen 
pieces of artillery secured their victory. Nevertheless, the troops, with their strong 
                                                
55 "The Boer War-Attacks Of Positions," Times, December 27, 1899, 
http://find.galegroup.com/dvnw/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=DVNW&userGroupName=ksu&tabID=T003
&docPage=article&docId=CS137160091&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0.  
56 Neville, Boer and Britisher in South Africa; A History of the Boer-British War and the Wars for United South 
Africa, Together with Biographies of the Great Men Who Made the History of South Africa, 148-49. 
57 Belfield, The Boer War, 17-19; Harold Raugh, The Victorians at War, 1815-1914: An Encyclopedia of British 
Military History (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 278-79. 
 31 
reinforcements, only inflicted seventy fatalities and wounded 100 Boers. The British also lost 
around fifty soldiers with over 100 wounded, many fewer than Talana Hill.58 Although the 
flanking assaults and khaki uniforms at Elandslaagte Station reduced British offensive 
vulnerabilities, their tactics remained largely non-targeted; British soldiers were largely 
unprotected, fighting primarily from lower ground with little cover and proved easy targets for 
the Boer guns. These two engagements revealed that the Boers were a greater enemy than 
expected and indicated that the tactics the British used tended to incur heavy losses, even if 
successful.  
Following these engagements on 19-21 October, the Boer’s superior numbers and tactics 
led to the start of one of the most defining, tactically impractical, and strategically unwise 
confrontations of the Boer War: the siege of the British garrison of Ladysmith from 30 October 
1899 to 28 February 1900. On 24 October 1899, Boer reinforcements began moving toward 
Talana Hill, threatening the remaining British forces and spurring a retreat toward Ladysmith.59 
British forces, approximately 10,000 to 12,000, reached Ladysmith on 27 October as the Boers, 
approximately 14,000 to 15,000, occupied surrounding hills and ridges, effectively trapping a 
significant portion of the British army in the garrison.60 This was a targeted tactic that neutralized 
British power, but required a large number of Boer forces to maintain. The British tried to thwart 
the Boers from completely encircling Ladysmith with a three-pronged assault attacking nearby 
Nickolson’s Nek on 29 and 30 October. However, the British infantry had little natural or 
artillery cover and failed to take Nicholson’s Nek because of the Boer’s lethal accuracy from the 
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surrounding hills.61 Although the British were forced to retreat into Ladysmith, the Boers did not 
attack and take advantage of the grossly exposed British troops massed at Ladysmith’s gates for 
entry.62 
The Siege of Ladysmith lasted four months, creating a standstill during which the Boers 
failed to force a British surrender and neither army was able to advance their strategic goals. The 
Boers initially hoped to force the British to capitulate by shelling the garrison. However, the 
British were relatively safe behind their walls, prompting the Boers to try and starve the British 
into submission before reinforcements arrived. This tactic required thousands of Boer troops to 
remain at Ladysmith, unable to advance other military objectives. This decision was a strategic 
mistake for the Boers since the garrison had enough supplies to last until its relief at the end of 
February and the Boers failed to destroy enough railroads, bridges, and roads to block British 
reinforcements, which would have been a targeted tactic.63 The Boers instead conducted artillery 
duels with the garrison nearly daily, but their artillery failed to overcome British fortifications 
just as British artillery failed to remove the sieging Boers, both nontargeted attacks that did not 
destroy the others’ ability to fight. Both armies only succeeded in forcing the other to remain 
locked in a protected position with no offensive options.64 
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The smaller British garrison of Kimberly was similarly and nearly simultaneously put 
under siege by the Boers on 14 October 1899, creating another stalemate until British 
reinforcements arrived. General Buller felt the sieged garrisons were indefensible and 
strategically unimportant to their battle against the Boers. However, the British citizenry placed 
heavy political pressure on the Cabinet to urge General Buller to relieve Ladysmith, the largest 
of the garrisons. Both sieges effectively trapped half of the British army in South Africa, which 
again was a targeted way to neutralize British forces but also immobilized over half of the Boer 
troops, which was strategically unwise since the Boers did not have enough troops to make 
significant gains elsewhere.65 Although the remaining Boers were virtually unopposed and 
controlled increasing amounts of the railway in Cape Colony, the Boers’ decentralized leadership 
became another liability. Tactical victories by independent companies failed to achieve cohesive 
strategic advancement to take the Harbor of Durban.66  
During the British attempt to relieve Kimberly in the Battle of the Modder River on 28 
November 1899, the Boers used targeted conceal and fire tactics particularly effectively. Because 
the Boers knew the British would take the only feasible route through the Modder river valley to 
reach Kimberly, they built trenches along the river and placed range markers along the valley. 
The Boers waited, hidden in their trenches, until British troops were within range and began 
firing, gunning down the unprotected and unaware soldiers. Because the Boers were located 
down on the flat river valley, they were able to fire horizontally, giving their rifles further lethal 
range than if they fired from above the British into the ground. Although both armies had around 
twenty-two heavy artillery guns, the British were far more vulnerable than the Boers. Bends in 
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the river also gave the Boers multiple angles to shoot at the British; when British artillery 
concentrated in one direction, the Boers could begin firing safely from another. The Boers used 
their trenches and the bends in the river to provide multiple, sheltered positions to fire upon the 
British, using targeted tactics that effectively diminished their vulnerabilities and took advantage 
of British exposure. The engagement left 475 British and 150 Boer casualties and only ended 
when the Boers retreated back toward Kimberly on 29 November.67 Even though both the British 
and Boers generally fired their artillery in an effort to destroy the entire enemy fighting force, a 
nontargeted offensive tactic, the defensive measures the Boers took against British artillery 
allowed the Boers almost two thirds fewer casualties. 
The two targeted Boer tactics of concealing troops in trenches and then firing upon the 
British when they drew near led to three British military defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein, 
and Colenso over the course of a few days in early December 1899, in what became known at 
“Black Week.” The British suffered a total of 2,800 casualties and the Boers only around 400.68 
In the Battle of Stormberg on 10 December, British forces sought to surprise the Boers, but 
moved forward without proper maps along a route that had not been previously scouted. The 
British were ignorant of the terrain, unaware of the Boer position, and moved in exposed 
columns. The Boers exploited these vulnerabilities with their conceal and fire tactics, entrapping 
the British with well-placed guns and surprising the fatigued British marching columns. The 
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British were forced to implement a retreat and furnish the Boers with a victory.69 In the Battle of 
Magersfontein on 11 December, the Boers again concealed themselves in trenches. The British 
tried to destroy the Boer position with a massive artillery attack, but the Boers remained 
relatively unscathed in the face of indiscriminate British nontargeted artillery. Few Boers were 
wounded, one soldier’s diary noted only three causalities, and instead used their accurate 
marksmanship to pin down the British heavy artillery and infantry with only Boer rifles. 
Although the British tried to mount a frontal assault and split the Boer forces, a targeted 
offensive tactic, they could not maintain their position under Boer fire and eventually retreated.70 
Lastly, the Battle of Colenso displayed the power of Boer concealment and accurate fire on 15 
December when the British sought to relieve Ladysmith. Because the British had only one 
feasible route toward the garrison, the Boers prepared fortified trenches in advance and 
positioned 6,000 soldiers and twelve artillery pieces along high ground the nearby river. The 
British planned a series of targeted brigade attacks with suppressive artillery fire as cover to keep 
the Boers in their trenches; however, their 35,000 soldiers and ninety-six cannons mistakenly 
shelled an abandoned Boer position. The Boers, well instructed to hold fire and stay hidden until 
the British drew near, remained concealed until the British were exposed without effective cover. 
                                                
69 Neville, Boer and Britisher in South Africa; A History of the Boer-British War and the Wars for United South 
Africa, Together with Biographies of the Great Men Who Made the History of South Africa, 201-05; Belfield, The 
Boer War, 48-50; Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, 283. 
70 Neville, Boer and Britisher in South Africa; A History of the Boer-British War and the Wars for United South 
Africa, Together with Biographies of the Great Men Who Made the History of South Africa, 207-09; Belfield, The 
Boer War, 52-59. 
 36 
As the British casualties mounted to over 1,000, they retreated, whereas multiple reports cite 
Boer fatalities at only six soldiers and around thirty wounded.71 
At the end of Phase One in early January 1900, Boer targeted tactics had effectively 
exploited British vulnerabilities, producing multiple tactical victories. However, the Boers lacked 
strong central leadership and overall strategic direction. Their forces originally invaded Natal 
intending to capture the Harbor of Durban before British reinforcements could arrive.72 Even 
with poor strategic direction, the Boers employed their tactics successfully and became well-
entrenched during the sieges, trapping the British army and denying them any ability to achieve 
significant military goals. They also kept the war on British territory and conducted military 
actions on rocky terrain that suited Boer tactics.73 Their skill with rifles allowed the Boers to take 
advantage of the British troops grouped in nontargeted traditional massed-line assaults. The 
British army’s high casualty rate was an important impetus for the British switch to targeted 
tactics, while the Boer’s targeted offensive tactics were a significant element of their military 
successes. 
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 Phase Two, January – June, 1900: The British Recovery 
10 January 1900 brought the British new leadership with Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts 
(1831-1914)74 as Commander-in-Chief over the Boer War and his Chief of Staff, Lord Horatio 
Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916),75 who became the subsequent Commander-in-Chief in 1901. 
Both were both experienced military leaders; Lord Roberts served in India, Afghanistan, and 
Egypt and Lord Kitchener in Palestine, Cyprus, Sudan, and Egypt. The British Cabinet felt great 
pressure to replace General Buller since his strategies and tactics had yet to achieve victory, so 
the appointment of Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener helped reinvigorate British morale and 
bolstered military support. In addition, the Boer War had grown much larger in magnitude than 
initially estimated, requiring increased leadership to oversee operations. Lord Roberts chose to 
keep General Buller in command of the Natal campaign because Lord Roberts respected General 
Buller’s experience and grasp of the war. Lord Roberts also did not immediately switch to 
different tactics and strategies, so relied on General Buller to continue his plans.76 
Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener arrived with tens of thousands of reinforcements, which 
significantly bolstered British power and made up for their remaining strategic and tactical 
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weaknesses.77 The Boers now possessed around 46,000 troops including new recruits and the 
British around 120,000. However, the British required nearly half their forces to protect their 
lines of communication, a critical vulnerability, whereas the Boer forces were highly 
independent and mobile and utilized their troops for combat instead of protection and 
communication.78 With new leadership and strong reinforcements, the British hoped it would 
only be a matter of time before their superior numbers ensured a victory. Although initially Lord 
Roberts employed the same nontargeted tactics as General Buller, he instituted new changes to 
increase the mobility of the army that allowed him to shift to more targeted tactics later in the 
war. The British were highly dependent on railways to carry their supplies, but Lord Roberts 
commanded troops to carry less, improving their speed, as well as ordered additional horses to 
create new cavalry units.79 Although these cavalry units appropriated large numbers of troops 
from existing infantry units, increased British mobility became an asset to Lord Roberts. The 
British were able to move their artillery much more quickly, deploy troops with greater ease, and 
catch up to retreating Boer forces more rapidly.80  
The Battle of Paardeberg on 18 February 1900 marked the turning point when Lord 
Roberts switched the offensive strategy in the middle of the battle away from the same British 
frontal assault to more targeted tactics. The British attacked the Boers’ rearguard at Ladysmith 
                                                
77 Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, 289. 
78 Belfield, The Boer War, 68; Neville, Boer and Britisher in South Africa; A History of the Boer-British War and 
the Wars for United South Africa, Together with Biographies of the Great Men Who Made the History of South 
Africa, 184; Wheeler, The Story of Lord Kitchener, 168.  
79 Kitchener, Broderick, and Maxwell, Australian and New Zealand Papers, 1-2. 
80 Belfield, The Boer War, 68; Bertram Frankenberger, Reorganization of the British forces under Lord Roberts in 
the Boer War, (Fort Leavenworth: The Command and General Staff School, 1928), 
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll14,459; Marquis and Hamilton. Earl Roberts, V.C., Lord Kitchener and 
the Great Boer War: Early Life of a Great Soldier, 414. 
 39 
positioned near the Modder River, initially proceeding in the same general pattern as many other 
British defeats. The Boers knew the British were coming and built fortified trenches that 
provided excellent protection as well as an unobstructed line of vision to British troops over the 
flat river valley. The British mistakenly shelled a Boer position that was unoccupied, and as they 
advanced, were unprepared when Boer artillery came in another direction. The British prepared a 
nontargeted frontal assault without suppressive supporting artillery and no simultaneous flanking 
assaults; their attack was thoroughly repelled by the well-defended Boers. At this point, Lord 
Roberts saw the futility in their tactics and ordered a change. Although the British had sufficient 
resources to continue using nontargeted tactics, Lord Roberts say that minimizing British 
vulnerabilities and targeting Boer vulnerabilities was a more efficient use of resources. He 
decided to trap the Boers in their trenches with heavy artillery to suppress all Boer fire without a 
direct assault. Although the Boers were relatively safe in their trenches, they also could not fire 
back at the British without exposing themselves. Gradually, the British snuck up on the Boers at 
night and, at close range, were able to trap the Boers completely with suppressive artillery and 
rifle fire. The British neutralized the Boers’ advantage in the trenches and used the artillery with 
a targeted goal that supported British troops instead of trying to destroy Boer forces. This 
combination of artillery at night allowed the British a targeted attack that minimized British 
vulnerabilities. On 27 February, the Boers recognized their plight and surrendered.81 This British 
victory began a tactical and strategic shift that relied less on massed frontal assaults, especially 
against such well-positioned enemies. Instead they focused on shorter advances coordinated with 
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suppressive fire to minimize exposure in addition to taking advantage of the terrain to conceal 
and cover.82 
Although the British had strong reinforcements, the final advances in the Relief of 
Ladysmith lasted over a month, demonstrating that numbers without effective tactics or a wise 
strategy do not always guarantee a quick victory. The night of 23-24 January 1900, British forces 
captured Spion Kop, a strategic point in the Boer defenses near Ladysmith, and began building 
trenches as the Boers did in so many successful battles. However, the British failed to scout the 
area effectively and the Boers could clearly see British troops in their shallow trenches the 
following morning. The British had no hope during the ensuing artillery battle, and surrendered 
Spion Kop after losing 1,300 troops to the Boers’ 300.83 The British required three more 
advances to relieve Ladysmith, first taking many strategic hills and the bank of the Tugela River 
north of Colenso on 18-19 February. However, the next British advance did not utilize these 
strategic positions well and the Boers, with fewer troops and artillery, utilized their defensive 
high ground near Ladysmith to hold and then repel the British from 20-25 February. Finally, the 
British employed targeted tactics that divided their forces for a multi-pronged attack that 
simultaneously used the cavalry, the artillery, and the infantry. One British division remained in 
place to distract and engage the main Boer force while the other forces moved to other locations 
surrounding Ladysmith in order to break through the Boers’ weaker defenses. Combined arms 
and flanking troop positions to minimize vulnerabilities while focusing on Boer vulnerabilities 
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were all targeted tactics that helped the British finally break the siege of Ladysmith on 28 
February after 118 days.84 
Although Ladysmith required several advances to secure, Lord Roberts employed 
targeted tactics to relieve Kimberly, which was close to surrendering, with a speedier and less 
costly attack. The British utilized the railways to keep the army well supplied, but Lord Roberts 
improved the army’s mobility in order to abandon the railway for a final march toward 
Kimberly. Although 500 horses died or became unfit, the British cavalry rode to Kimberly fast 
enough to outrun Boer intelligence, which thought these troops were a feint instead of a true 
attack. British speed allowed the cavalry to break through Boer defenses that were unprepared 
for such an assault, ending the 124-day siege of Kimberly on 15 February with only nine British 
casualties. This rapid and flanking attack used targeted tactics that served the British much better 
than their usual frontal assault.85After both Ladysmith and Kimberly were relieved, the British 
army concentrated their forces and used their superior numbers to easily overwhelm Boer forces. 
The British invaded the Orange Free State and took the capitol of Bloemfontein on 13 March 
through sheer nontargeted military might. They continued with an arduous march through the 
Transvaal and continually pushed back the defending Boer forces until the British took the 
capitol of Pretoria on 13 June 1900.86 The British, now confident in numbers, mistakenly thought 
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the Boer’s lack of massed armed resistance meant they had finally won the war and Lord Roberts 
declared victory.87  
 
 Phase Three, March 1900 – May 1902: Guerilla Warfare 
Although the Boers decreased their direct engagements with the British following the end 
of their sieges, the Boers regrouped into a robust guerilla-like fighting force with targeted tactics 
that plagued the British from March 1900 to the official end of the war on 31 May 1902. Ill-
advisedly, British forces did not pursue the Boers after the relief of Ladysmith and Kimberly on 
28 and 15 February 1900, allowing the Boers peaceful retreats and time to formulate a new 
strategy. The Boers decided that though the conventional war was lost, their small, highly mobile 
fighting groups could still take advantage of British vulnerabilities. By continually harassing 
British forces, the Boers hoped that eventually the British would abandon their fight in South 
Africa.88 The Boer fighting force numbered in total around 60,000, but when the Boers were not 
needed for an operation, they resumed farm work. No more than 15,000 Boers were in the field 
at any one time, usually moving in groups of fifty to two hundred men, all on horseback with 
around 200 pounds per horse. These extremely mobile forces moved across 150,000 square miles 
of countryside, eluding British forces while capturing convoys and destroying rail lines and 
bridges to disrupt supply routes.89 Their targeted guerilla tactics used their resources efficiently, 
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expending few lives and requiring limited supplies while creating expensive disruptions and 
diversions for British forces. 
By 1 September 1901, both the Orange Free State and Transvaal were formally annexed 
to Great Britain and the British controlled all major towns; however, the Boers still freely 
roamed the countryside. Both Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts urged the Boers to surrender 
voluntarily and halt the destruction of their countries and earn clemency, but with little success. 
The British forces were now mostly on horseback though few troops had quality horsemanship 
and all carried around 300 pounds. Although the cavalry was capable of more targeted tactics 
than foot soldiers, the British still had little chance of capturing the small and light Boer fighting 
groups. Most of the total British force of 200,000 solders were required to protect their lines of 
communication; around 75,000 troops chased the Boers around 150,000 square miles of in 
columns of 1,000 to 5,000. British intelligence was too slow to keep up with the movements of 
the Boers, consequently orders from British central command were often too late to be effective. 
In addition, the trained British cavalry disliked fighting on foot except at short range. They 
struggled to hit the Boers by rifle while mounted, which the Boers specialized in. British horses 
were also not adequately acclimated to Africa after being shipped by sea; of the 518,794 horses 
shipped to Africa, 347,007 died from poor care and exhaustion.90   
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The Boers continued to trouble and elude the British army until Lord Kitchener instituted 
blockhouses along all integral railways. Blockhouses were simple but fortified structures that 
could be built in six hours with six trained engineers and a few infantrymen. Bullet-proof metal 
sheets with twelve rifle slots, a perimeter trench and wire fence, as well as tin cans strung on 
wires as an alarm between blockhouses effectively hindered free movement around the 
countryside, a targeted tactic to hinder the Boers’ ability to fight. Some Boers learned the 
locations of all houses and with their small fighting forces, could move successfully through 
without alerting the British, but most found the blockhouses difficult to break through.91 These 
blockhouses required fewer resources than chasing the Boers around the countryside and proved 
an effective, targeted tactic. 
Lord Kitchener came up with a “drive system” in February 1901 in hopes of successfully 
pushing the Boers from 20,000 square miles of territory while destroying their means of 
sustenance through a scorched-earth policy. This punishment tactic was nontargeted and both 
required and destroyed massive amounts of resources. These drives used a total of around sixty 
British columns to march in coordinating sweeps, forcing the Boers to either fight or become 
trapped against the mountainous terrain or British searchlights and guns. The British managed to 
commandeer 272,572 head of stock, 2,281 Boer carts, and eleven guns, but only 1,350 Boers, the 
rest of whom slipped through the mountains or British columns. Although these drives were 
relatively ineffective in capturing Boers, the concurrent scorched-earth policy increased Boer 
war-weariness. The British were accused of wantonly destroying Boer homes, who in turn 
accused the Boers of destroying property. Although the destruction drove the Boers to negotiate 
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for peace, it also wrecked land and property that the British hoped to gain. The peace talks failed, 
but the Boers were beginning to tire of their guerilla campaign.92 
The drives and scorched-earth policy also displaced large numbers of Boers and African 
families who were sent to British concentration camps. By July 1901, thirty-one camps held 
75,819 refugees; lack of fresh food and contagious epidemics officially led to a 1,304 deaths, but 
reports cite the fatalities at tens of thousands. These camps damaged Boer morale and weakened 
the Boer’s will to continue fighting as well as became highly unpopular with the British public 
who criticized this tactic as inhumane. It was a nontargeted tactic that cost enormous civilian 
casualties. Although the camps and scorched-earth policy were effective in bringing the Boers to 
new peace talks on 12 April 1902, they were highly inefficient.93  
The Second Boer War finally concluded on 31 May 1902 although the British failed to 
capture any of the Boer leaders or destroy a large portion of their troops, indicating that the 
British shift to more targeted tactics destroyed the Boer’s willingness to fight without needing to 
destroy their entire fighting force. The British process of attrition cut the Boer forces in half, not 
by killing them, but primarily by creating circumstances to encourage desertion. The British also 
managed to capture around 19,500 Boers, but only around 2,000 Boers were killed in the final 
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year of the war. The low fatality count indicates that the Boers were skilled tacticians, but with 
an ineffective strategy against the British. Lord Kitchener’s strategy, however, successfully 
compelled the guerilla fighters to surrender, an unusual victory in such a short time compared to 
most guerilla warfare throughout history.94 
The British learned throughout the Boer War that their traditional training was poor 
preparation for war against the Boers and targeted tactics were much more effective. British 
tactics primarily focused on massed assaults in formation and firing artillery indiscriminately at 
the enemy position. The artillery in this time period was relatively unsuccessful as cover; 
gunners often missed the enemy position, hit the enemy position as well as their own frontal 
assault, or failed to provide any cover at all. Tactics were slow to change, but eventually the 
British shifted away from massed attacks in line to targeted shorter advances that were 
coordinated with their supporting artillery. Greater portions of the infantry began riding horses 
and carrying less, becoming a more mobile and effective fighting force as a whole, as well as 
used terrain to minimize exposure.95 
The Boers employed targeted tactics well suited to their strengths, but failed to 
implement a successful strategy, illustrating the power of targeted tactics as well as the 
importance of strategy. Although the Boers could have engaged the British with similarly 
nontargeted frontal assaults, they chose to minimize their vulnerabilities and disrupt British 
strengths. They were impressive riflemen and fought unmounted, but used their horses to deploy 
rapidly as well as retreat quickly. Their independence and lack of a fixed base meant they could 
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engage in targeted military actions without waiting for orders and employ guerilla-like tactics 
swiftly. The Boers avoided concentrating their forces and, especially in the third phase of the war 
from 1900 – 1902, fought more “actions” than “battles.” These smaller engagements decreased 
hazardous exposure as well as rendered British training to conduct volleys of fire between lines 
of soldiers ineffective. However, despite their tactical superiority, the Boers failed to raise the 
cost of the British invasion enough that the British gave up their fight. Boer strategy opened with 
a strong invasion of Natal, but once the sieges began, they failed to continue making progress 
toward the Harbor of Durban, failed to keep the British out of the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal, and finally failed to force a British retreat.96 
Tactics and strategy are concurrently significant to military actions; the British 
demonstrated the efficacy of targeted over nontargeted tactics, and the Boers illustrated that 
successful tactics require a strong guiding strategy for full effectiveness. The British began 
decreasing their vulnerabilities and expended fewer soldiers and resources to reach their military 
objectives, although without reinforcements, their shifting tactics may not have allowed the 
British to achieve eventual victory. In addition, had the Boers successfully implemented their 
primary strategy, the war may have ended rather differently. Nevertheless, the Boer War aptly 
showcased the advantage of employing targeted tactics to achieve victory. 
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Chapter 5 - The Winter War: 1939-1940  
Figure 2 Map of the Winter War 
97 
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 Although the Red Army attacked Finland in the Winter War with a numerically greater 
and vastly more powerful force, a war intended to last two weeks became months of intense 
combat.98 The Finns’ targeted tactics and strategically placed defenses, in addition to what many 
historians describe as “sisu,” or a combination of guts, daring, and tenacity, thwarted the Soviet 
Union’s attempt to obtain Finland.99 The Red Army began their attack with a strategy of 
annihilation but was forced into a strategy of attrition as the Finns used targeted tactics well 
suited to maneuver and defense. Although the Finn’s defensive position was a great asset, their 
focus on destroying the Soviet’s ability to fight while reducing their own vulnerabilities 
produced targeted tactical decisions that saved Finland from occupation.  
 
 Before the War: Military Preparedness 
During the inter-war period, the twenty miles separating Leningrad and the Finnish 
border became a major security concern to the Soviet Union. Although General Secretary Joseph 
Stalin (1879–1953)100 did not believe Finland itself was a threat, he did not trust their statement 
of neutrality and feared potential German aggression via the Karelian Isthmus.101 The Soviet 
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Union negotiated with Finland for half a year in an attempt to move the Finnish border twenty 
miles into Finland and obtain several islands in the Bay of Finland in return for 3,450 square 
miles of Soviet Keralia in return. However, Finland refused to surrender their territory and 
negotiations ended on 13 November 1939.102  
The Finnish government expected that the West would come to their aid should the 
Soviets attack, so it allocated many government funds to the 1940 Olympics instead of war 
preparation. These included a new stadium that hosted multiple anti-aircraft guns on its 
observation tower after the Red Air Force attacked Helsinki.103 On 26 November 1939 seven 
shots were heard inside Soviet territory near Mainila that signified a shift in Finnish-Soviet 
relations. Although General Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim (1867–1951)104 had already ordered 
Finnish guns out of range of Soviet troops to prevent unintended hostilities, Soviet Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986)105 sent a diplomatic note 
claiming that four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine wounded from the exchange. The Finnish 
government sought resolution through diplomatic channels but received silence from Commissar 
Molotov. General Mannerheim resigned the next day out of frustration when the Finnish 
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government neglected to identify this incident as a trigger for war and immediately ready the 
Finnish army for attack.106 
The commanders of the Red Army expected a total defeat of the Finnish military within 
two weeks, aided by the Finnish population who would welcome the Communist liberators. The 
commanders wanted to emulate the German Blitzkrieg with a plan that would overwhelm the 
Finns with a massive ground offensive. Aerial support would destroy Finnish communications 
and spread terror among the populace to attain victory before the harsh winter began. Although 
the Soviets planned a strategy of maneuver, their challenges on the battlefield, such as geography 
and Finnish obstacles, required a shift to a strategy of attrition, for which their tactics were also 
better suited. 107  
Most of the bogs and smaller lakes were frozen enough to drive on but not enough snow 
had fallen yet to be a major obstacle.108 Twenty-six divisions, one motorized arm corps, and five 
armored brigades were initially sent into Finland with a total of around 500,000 soldiers, 2,000 
tanks, and 1,000 airplanes.109 The 7th Army would attack the Karelian Isthmus, breach the 
Mannerheim Line, take Viipuri, and eventually move on to Helsinki. The 8th Army would attack 
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north of Lake Ladoga and circle southeast to break the northern Finnish defenses on the Isthmus. 
The 9th Army would move west to divide Finland in half and cut its communications with 
Sweden and the 14th Army would capture the Finnish artic port of Petsamo to cut 
communications and halt any aid from arriving from the north.110  
Despite the Red Army’s massive resources, they were not prepared to fight well during 
winter in the forest. The war occurred after General Secretary Stalin’s purge, so most Red Army 
officers had little experience; training standards between units varied greatly and largely 
emphasized mass frontal assaults and volleys of rifle fire.111 This method of fighting begs for 
qualification as nontargeted; grouping soldiers in one location leaves them vulnerable to various 
methods of attack, such as artillery or ambush, and volleys of rifle fire are inefficient against an 
enemy that is spread out, concealed, and well fortified. Soviet field guns were also best at a close 
range on a flat-trajectory and few of their howitzers were able to angle very high, leaving both 
weapons less effective among the trees that encompassed much of Finnish territory. Although the 
Soviets had submachine guns, they were only used for police work because the military preferred 
rifles. The Red Army also had no winter camouflage for their soldiers or tanks until January and 
although some units possessed ski-combat manuals, none of the soldiers were trained in ski-
combat before the conflict began. In addition, although the Finns had no operational armor, the 
Soviets brought modern antitank guns on their campaign, which were of great use to the Finns 
once captured. The Soviets also used outdated maps and unreliable intelligence regarding 
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Finnish defenses, which meant they severely underestimated the quality and quantity of Finnish 
fortifications and instead expected the Winter War to progress similarly to their invasion of 
Poland.112 
General Mannerheim’s strategy for the Finnish Army relied on creating a war of attrition 
and enduring long enough against the Soviets that either aid from the West or Finland’s own 
tenacity forced a negotiated settlement. General Mannerheim knew that the thick forests north of 
Lake Ladoga would diminish the Red Army’s numerical advantage so he could concentrate his 
forces on the Karelian Isthmus. In reality, General Mannerheim knew at his 72 years of age that 
foreign aid was not probable and did not expect his army to perform as admirably as they did.113 
However, the Finns had several advantages. Before the war, most Finns trained on terrain that 
was similar to terrain they fought on during the war, so they knew how to utilize the forest and 
practiced ambushes, deceptions, and raids. These became highly valuable tactics against the Red 
Army in the north. They had meticulous maps that were already ranged correctly during trainings 
for their batteries in order to make the most use of their minimal resources. Their artillery 
contained primary howitzers and mortars that were light and could angle over trees. Many of 
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their troops were trained in ski combat, which is highly mobile, and their standard infantry rifle 
was of better quality than the Soviet equivalent.114 These resources and training set the Finns up 
to employ targeted tactics that focused on discriminate use of ammunition to negate the Soviet’s 
resource advantages. 
However, before 1918 the Finns did not have a formal army and never practices full-scale 
mobilization. Not enough of their able-bodied soldiers had formal training and officers had little 
practice commanding large units. Most soldiers had not seen a tank or even trained in anti-tank 
tactics. At the beginning of hostilities, only 10 divisions were fully equipped. Some of their 
equipment dated to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and few divisions had ordinance 
bigger than a maxim gun. The army had 60 days-worth of ammunition for rifles and light 
automatics as well as gas and oil, around 20 days-worth of shells for light field guns and 122mm 
howitzers as well as shells for their heavy and coastal batteries, and only 30 days of aviation fuel. 
The Finns had the same total amount of ammunition in reserve as the Soviets could afford to use 
in one day.115 
General Mannerheim positioned the 2nd and 3rd Corps, each with three divisions along the 
Mannerheim Line and sent the 4th Corps with two divisions north of Lake Ladoga to cover 60 
miles. The North Finland Group, which was a collection of Civil Guards, border guards, and 
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reservists covered the remaining 625 miles of the Soviet border for a total of nine divisions and 
300,000 soldiers.116 
 
 Phase One, 30 November 1939 – 8 January 1940: Finland Holds Fast 
 On 30 November 1939 Soviet planes dropped leaflets over Helsinki and Viipuri that 
urged Finns to embrace communism and overthrow their government. These leaflets were 
followed by a bombing attack that targeted transportation and economic centers in Helsinki, 
Viipuri, Turku, Imatra, and Lahti, killing 200 Finns.117 Although these targets were intended to 
take out Finnish capabilities, Finnish transportation and economic centers were too widely 
dispersed for the Soviets to take advantage of an otherwise targeted tactic. General Mannerheim 
immediately withdrew his resignation as the Red Army invaded and Finns were ordered to 
evacuate their homes on the anticipated fronts. On 1 December the Soviets announced they had 
“liberated” the area surrounding Terijoki and set up the Democratic People’s Government of the 
Finnish Republic which served as a piece of propaganda with no real political impact. Although 
the new “head of state” signed a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with the Soviet Union 
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on 5 December and formed the First Army Corps of Finland’s People’s Army, neither played a 
role in the remainder of the war.118  
 The Soviet Air Force was comprised of 3,000 planes against the Finns’ 162. The Soviets 
conducted 2,075 bombing attacks in 516 locations, killing 650 civilians and wounding 2,000. 
Through the course of the war the Finns shot down up to 800 Soviet planes with anti-aircraft 
guns and 240 by Finnish planes. Soviets shot down 26 Finnish planes in return and struggled to 
find effective transportation or economic targets in Finland’s unconcentrated population. 
Although rail lines were easy targets, they were also easy to repair and few civilian centers were 
strategically important to the war. Although the Soviets had decisive air superiority, it was not 
strategically significant to any military operations before February.119 Attacks on civilians were 
nontargeted since they supported no strategic goals and did not hinder the Finnish Army’s ability 
to fight. In addition, Finnish transportation and economic centers were too widely distributed 
throughout the country for air power to significantly affect Finnish capabilities. Neither the Red 
nor Finnish Navies played a large role since both were created as coastal defense forces and not 
equipped for considerable naval warfare. The Red Navy engaged in some ship to shore gunnery 
                                                
118 Seweryn Bialer, Stalin and His Generals; Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (New York: Pegasus, 1969); 
Edwards, White Death: Russia’s War on Finland, 1939-40, 117; Jakobson, Finland Survived: An Account of the 
Finnish-Soviet Winter War, 1939-1940, 166, 170; Mannerheim, Memoirs, 323; Kimmo Rentola, “The Finnish 
Communists and the Winter War,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 4 (1998), 600; Rentola, “Intelligence 
and Stalin’s Two Critical Decisions in the Winter War, 1939-1940,” 1090; Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-
Finnish War of 1939-1940, 52-53; Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia, 
47. 
119 Eloise and Paananen. The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-40, 3; Mannerheim, Memoirs, 346; 
Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, 187-92. 
 57 
duels, but conducted few naval operations. In addition, the Gulf of Finland began to freeze by the 
end of December, ending the possibility for further operations.120 
The primary theatre of the Winter War was located in the Karelian Isthmus along the 
Mannerheim Line. This 80-mile line of Finnish fortifications was comprised of 109 reinforced 
concrete pillboxes with armor plate covering the roofs and gun ports, situated along lakes and 
rivers that buttressed the defensive fortifications. The line was largely erected earlier in 1939 and 
stretched from Lake Ladoga to the Gulf, neither of which froze enough to support the weight of 
tanks until February, making the line difficult to outflank. In addition, Finns placed miles of 
barbed wire, concrete and wooden anti-tank obstacles, ditches, and mine fields in front of the line 
as well as blew up 142 bridges, viaducts, and other road structures before the Soviets drew 
near.121 These obstacles were a targeted tactic because they hindered the Soviets ability to 
advance and directly attack the Mannerheim Line. They also supported the strategic goal to 
create a war of attrition that lasted long enough for the Finns to reach a settlement.  
General Marshal Kiril Meretskov (1897-1968)122 led 120,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and 
600 pieces of artillery toward 21,000 Finns deployed in “covering groups” to delay Soviet 
progress through the buffer zone between the border and the Mannerheim Line. These groups 
rolled cellophane over frozen lakes to make them look unfrozen and left mines on pull ropes in 
the lakes to break ice and force the Red Army to travel in straight lines on the roads or through 
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the forests, both of which slowed their travel and left forces exposed to flank attacks and 
ambush. The Finns also left booby traps in villages that were evacuated along the Soviet border 
to cause delays through both physical destruction as well as fear of triggering further traps.123 
These were targeted tactics that forced the Soviets to march in vulnerable positions. 
The Finnish Army devised many effective and economical tactics to slow the progress of 
the Red Army, primarily in response to their first experiences fighting tanks. Although some 
Finns panicked in the face of Soviet tanks, soldiers in the Isthmus destroyed 80 tanks the first 
week. Tank-hunter squads had a 70 percent casualty rate, but if soldiers lived long enough to get 
close, tanks were easily immobilized by jamming crowbars and logs into the bogie wheels, a 
useful critical vulnerability.124 In addition, fighting in the buffer zone inaugurated the use of the 
Molotov Cocktail. Supposedly, a Finnish soldier became frustrated and in desperation threw a 
kerosene lantern at a tank and the grease caught on fire. Finns mixed gasoline, kerosene, tar, and 
chloride of potassium in a bottle and named the incendiary after Commissar Molotov, whom 
they blamed for the war. Finns used around 70,000 Molotov Cocktails during the course of the 
war, 20,000 of which were made on the front lines. The Finnish army gained valuable experience 
and learned how to diminish one of the Soviet’s greatest advantages. They destroyed dozens of 
tanks before the Red Army even reached the Mannerheim Line.125  
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By 6 December most of the “covering troops” in the 2nd and 3rd Corps withdrew to the 
Mannerheim Line as the Red Army advanced. Taipale was located on flat marshy land at the 
north end of the Mannerheim Line near Lake Ladoga and received the brunt of the Red Army’s 
initial campaign. The Soviet’s strategy on the Mannerheim Line was to wear down the Finns 
with artillery fire and reduce their ability to respond during the subsequent tank and infantry 
attacks. Depending on the accuracy of artillery strikes to cover infantry without friendly fire, this 
could be a targeted attack, but at this point in time Soviet technology was not accurate enough to 
allow the infantry and armor sufficient cover before an exposed frontal assault. Instead these 
nontargeted tactics used indiscriminate artillery fire and vulnerable infantry charges. In addition, 
tanks were intended to protect the infantry, but the Soviets failed to coordinate effectively to 
offer mutual support.126    
The Soviets initiated on 6 December with a four-hour bombardment followed by an 
infantry swarm to gain the Kuokunniemi peninsula. This open, marshy land was an intentional 
strategic loss by the Finns that drew the Red Army into a nontargeted attack. The concentrated 
formation of soldiers with no snow camouflage left the soldiers highly vulnerable; soldiers were 
easy targets on the flat peninsula in their khaki uniforms. The Soviets suffered hundreds of 
casualties, retreated, and halted any significant assaults until reinforcements arrived.127   
By 14 December the Red Army had three divisions near Taipale with 84 batteries against 
the Finnish nine. The Soviets again opened with an artillery barrage but the Finns did not 
respond in order to conserve ammunition. An entire infantry division then marched toward the 
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Mannerheim Line flanked by 50 tanks intending to overwhelm Finnish forces. However, once 
they reached a pre-plotted line, the Finns opened their guns into the unprotected and unconcealed 
infantry. This wave retreated with 300 to 400 casualties and 18 destroyed tanks. On 16 
December the Soviets conducted an eight-hour artillery barrage, attacked with the infantry and 
tanks, and managed to overwhelm the Finns and breach the Mannerheim Line in two locations. 
However, by the end of the night the Finns had regained their position with mortars, grenades, 
rifle fire, submachine guns, and automatic rifles. Thousands of Soviet soldiers lost their lives in 
their nontargeted attacks on the Mannerheim Line in this area, but the Finns never lost this sector 
throughout the entire war.128   
 After failing to pierce the Mannerheim Line near Taipale, the red Army turned to the 
Summa Sector. On 17 December the Soviets opened with a five-hour artillery barrage as well as 
air strikes from 200 aircraft. They attacked Finnish positions in the village of Summa as well as 
the road defenses northeast of the village and destroyed most of the Finns communications in the 
area so Finnish command had no idea what was occurring. This was a targeted tactic by the 
Soviets in order to hinder the Finns ability to fight. However, no significant breakthroughs 
occurred. Although the anti-tank obstacles were too small to stop the tanks, the tanks were forced 
to expose their underside as they climbed over the obstacles. The Finns learned that in that 
vulnerable position, the tanks could not fire low enough to stop soldiers from placing mines right 
in front of the advancing tank. Many tanks tried to drive on the frozen lakes but these exposed 
locations made them easy targets to Finnish ambush parties and antitank guns. The Soviets lost 
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35 tanks on the 17th, a third of the tanks deployed.129 Soviet nontargeted tactics that exposed their 
tanks and Finnish targeted tactics that positioned mines directly under an advancing tank were a 
destructive combination. 
By 20 December, seven infantry divisions and two armored brigades with at least 500 
guns and at least that many aircraft had failed to break through the Summa sector. The Finns 
utilized ditches and bogs as well as mine fields and tank traps and closer to the Mannerheim Line 
used artillery, antitank obstacles, camouflaged pits. If infantry and tanks advanced further, the 
Finns used gasoline bombs, satchel charges, cluster grenades, and small arms as well as their few 
Bofors antitank guns. This combination of obstacles and use of varied and economical weapons 
was a targeted used of resources that allowed the Finns to repel every attack as well as destroy a 
total of 239 tanks in the Isthmus. One of the responding Soviet tactics sent lateral lines of 
infantry toward the front in order to clear mines from the paths of tanks, a nontargeted tactic that 
placed soldiers in vulnerable positions, although manpower was one of their greatest, dispensable 
resources.130 
 
 Tolvajrävi Road 
At the outset of the war the Soviet 139th Division began marching toward a strategic 
transportation junction at the intersection of Tolvajrävi Road and the Värtsilä rail line. 
Tolvajrävi Road ran behind the Mannerheim Line north through the interior of Finland and 
transected the Värtsilä rail line, which supplied the Ladoga front and would provide the Soviets 
with a means to attack the Mannerheim Line from the rear. The 139th Division had 20,000 
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soldiers, 147 pieces of artillery, and 45 panzer guns against a small contingent of Finns stationed 
in the area. Although Finnish units were spread too thinly for a full-scale defensive front, they 
conducted surprise ambushes in order to stall the advance of the Soviets and await 
reinforcements.131 
By 6 December all units retreated to Lake Tolvajrävi, which offered a strong defensive 
position in the path of the Red Army. On 8 December the Soviets advanced near this point and 
the Finns launched a night raid. Their bicycle battalion feinted in the early morning allowing the 
4th and 9th companies to ski undetected across the lake toward the Soviet positions. The Finns 
fired from shifting positions as they circled the Soviet encampment in the dark. Although the 
Soviet casualty count is unknown, the Finns only bore one casualty. This targeted attack took 
advantage of the Finns mobility, which allowed discriminate attacks from multiple adaptable 
positions, against the concentrated and vulnerable Soviet forces. On 10 December an entire 
Soviet battalion laid an ambush on the Finnish supply line but were so hungry that they became 
distracted by the Finnish rations in what became known as the “Sausage War.” The Soviets lost 
momentum and the Finns regrouped and used their bayonets in close combat and then pursued 
the fleeing Soviets. The Finnish casualty count is unknown, but over 100 Soviets were killed. 
Another Soviet ambush was attempted from south of the village over one of the lakes. However, 
the Finns noticed this attack beforehand and gunned down over 200 Soviets in their highly 
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exposed position on the ice.132 Although the Soviets had far more soldiers, their hunger and 
unadapt ambushes failed to dislodge the Finns from their defensive position.  
The Finns began a counteroffensive on 12 December with three groups of soldiers 
making a pincer movement, attacking from the north, west, and south of the Soviet position. The 
northern arm snuck up on a large number of Soviets who were simultaneously sneaking up on 
them, leading to a surprise engagement on both sides. However, the Soviets had far more guns 
and soldiers, which forced the Finns to retreat except for a small contingent of 100 Finnish 
soldiers who never received the order. This group engaged a large number of the Red Army and 
held them in place, blocking them from fighting elsewhere. The southern arm also suffered from 
lack of soldiers and ammunition so could not gain and hold any ground.133 
However, the center group of soldiers made moderate progress toward a hotel that gave 
the Soviets a strategic vantage point. The Finns used their Maxim machine guns in lieu of light 
artillery, which required soldiers to carry the 40-pound guns close to the front and use them 
without a tripod, but this allowed close coordination with the infantry. Three tanks moved in to 
reinforce the Soviet infantry under attack but drove on a narrow road that trapped them in 
exposed locations. The Finns destroyed the tanks with their only antitank gun before the tanks 
could get close enough to offer any support; dislocating one of the Soviet’s greatest strengths 
before it could aid the Soviets was a targeted tactic that capitalized on the tanks’ exposed 
position. At the hotel the Finnish soldiers attacked from two directions with grenades they threw 
into foxholes and snipers who aimed at the hotel windows. Although the Soviets were under fire 
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from three directions, they managed to fire from the top floor of the hotel and keep the Finns at 
bay until the Finns made a costly charge to storm the hotel. The Finns threw grenades ahead of 
them to clear each room and eventually took the hotel and controlled this vantage point. The 
Finns lost 30 percent of their officers and 25 percent of their enlisted soldiers; these were 
proportionally the highest Finnish losses of the war.134 The Finns used diverse weaponry to 
suppress Soviet fire and clear Soviet defenses while attacking from multiple directions. These 
targeted tactics minimized their vulnerabilities of their soldiers while taking advantage of 
multiple types of firepower for different situations. The Finns’ nontargeted charge to storm the 
hotel cost them dearly in casualties, but the mix of targeted tactics with this nontargeted tactic 
allowed a small Finnish contingent to succeed offensively against a larger Soviet contingent. 
From 13 to 20 December the Red and Finnish Army were at an impasse on the Tolvajrävi 
Road; the Finns did not have enough resources to push the Soviets back further and the Soviets 
were paralyzed in the foot-deep snow without skis. They could not flank the well-defended 
Finnish position and although the Finns had little ammunition, they became adept at waiting until 
Soviet tanks were in vulnerable positions before destroying them, a targeted tactic that conserved 
their supply of ammunition and cost the Soviets. The Finns began sporadically ambushing Red 
Army positions, using their white camouflage and skis to appear suddenly and then ski away 
before the Soviets could respond. On 20 December the Soviets attacked in a column headed by a 
tank on a narrow road; the Finns managed to blow up the tank, blocking the road to any progress 
from the rest of the Soviet armor. The Finns aimed one of their antitank Bofor guns at the last 
tank in the column and blew it up; they then slowly began picking off the tanks down the road 
and Soviets abandoned their running vehicles, allowing the Finns to capture all remaining 
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working tanks and trucks. This method was not targeted but was efficient; their tactics allowed 
the Finns to capture many of the vehicles in perfect condition and destroy the Soviet threat 
without destroying the entire Soviet force. Neither side launched any further significant 
offensives for the rest of the war; over 4,000 Soviets had been killed and over 5,000 wounded in 
this sector. In total the Finns captured 59 tanks, three armored cars, as well as hundreds of 
machine guns and thousands of rifles with around 630 killed and over 1,320 wounded.135 
Another Soviet contingent on the northern shoreline of Lake Ladoga was victim to a 
unique Finnish tactic called a motti. The Finns attacked an invading Soviet force on 13 
December but were forced to retreat in the face of Soviet firepower. The Finns continued to 
skirmish with the Soviets but neither force made much progress. Then, on 26 December the 
Finns concentrated their forces in multiple positions flanking the road where the Red Army was 
located. The Finns coordinated their attacks in snow camouflage on skis and forcibly divided the 
Soviets into 10 separate segments, called mottis. The Soviets fortified their disconnected 
positions but over the next month were subject to numerous small-scale Finnish assaults as well 
as lack of food and freezing temperatures. The Soviet air force tried to resupply the Soviets with 
ammunition and food, but largely failed to curb starvation and frostbite. In one instance, Finnish 
soldiers snuck into the motti at night, killed the gun crews, and stole two 120mm mortars and 
some shells. The next morning the Finns used their newly acquired artillery to destroy some 
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Soviet bunkers that Finnish grenades and submachine guns could not destroy. No motti 
surrendered even though one of the mottis suffered 83 casualties from a total of 85 soldiers.136 
Although the Finns did not have enough resources to storm the mottis, their battle of 
attrition eventually wiped out all but three, the largest of which was over twenty square miles on 
the shoreline of Lake Ladoga. The Finns acquired a large number of tanks, ammunition, and 
artillery to boost their reserves. The use of mottis was a targeted tactic that was highly successful 
without the advantage of being on the defensive. The Finns destroyed the Soviet’s ability to fight 
with far fewer soldiers, fewer weapons, and less ammunition thanks to their mobility and 
concealment techniques in the forest. However, the mottis were strategically unwise since the 
Finnish soldiers were also unavailable to aid the Mannerheim Line. The length of time and 
number of Finns required to slowly eliminate the Soviet mottis worked defensively in the Red 
Army’s favor.137  
 
 The Northern Forest 
Part of the Soviet strategy was to cut through the middle of Finland and sever Finland’s 
internal communications and principal contact points to Sweden. General Mannerheim received 
reports that the Soviets were going to send 33 divisions into the northern forest but he did not 
believe the Red Army would try to send such a large force through the dense, wintry woodland. 
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However, the Soviets had secretly built roads toward the border that aided in a swift deployment 
of troops and deployed over 60 divisions, which was half of their infantry and about a quarter of 
their armor. In this theatre, 42 Soviets were deployed for every one Finnish soldier.138 
However, the Red Army was ill prepared for the coldest Finnish winter since 1828 with 
temperatures averaging 42.7 degrees Fahrenheit below zero in Sodankylä,	located	in	the	northern	half	of	Finland.	Soviet	petroleum	lubricants	froze	at	sub-zero	temperatures	and	hindered	weapons	from	firing.	Although	the	Red	Army	was	issued	ski	warfare	manuals	before	deploying,	they	had	few	skis	and	no	training.	They	were	expected	to	flight	in	their	skis,	which	had	tight	bindings	that	were	not	meant	to	be	taken	off	easily,	with	their	bayonets	in	close	combat.	Unfortunately,	using	a	bayonet	effectively	requires	the	traction	that	skis	were	created	to	circumvent.	In	addition,	Soviet	units	traveled	along	roads	where	a	single	division	could	be	spread	out	over	twenty-five	miles,	vulnerable	to	attack.	The	Soviets	also	liked	roaring	fires	to	keep	warm	and	their	kitchens	were	highly	visible	and	created	large	plumes	of	smoke,	all	providing	excellent	targets	to	the	highly	mobile	Finnish	soldiers.139	
Finnish soldiers, on the other hand, used gasoline and gun oil to clean their rifles and 
alcohol and glycerin for automatic weapons and artillery. Their skis had no heel straps that 
allowed them to jump off quickly to fight and then jump back on to ski quickly away. They 
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dressed in many layers of snow camouflage, used small stoves that produced little smoke, and 
camouflaged their dugouts that they also lined with furs and skins to keep warm.140  
Although many battles were fought in the northern forests, the Battle of Suomussalmi 
represents the epitome of clashes between the Soviets and the Finns. The 163rd and 44th Soviet 
Divisions, a total of 48,000 soldiers, 335 cannons, over 100 tanks, and 50 armored cars, aimed to 
capture Oulu, Finland’s central rail connection to Sweden. The Finns were unprepared to defend 
such a strategically important target and could only gather “Task Force Susi” and JR-27 to the 
area for a total of 17,000 soldiers and 11 cannons. The soldiers hastily evacuated the 4,000 
residents of Suomussalmi on 7 December and tried to torch the entire town to destroy any shelter 
and future hideouts for the Red Army; that evening, the 163rd Division marched into 
Suomussalmi unopposed. On 9 December General Mannerheim ordered the Finns to completely 
destroy the 163rd Division, so on 12 December the Finnish soldiers began their first of many 
road-cutting operations. Many of the Finnish ski troopers grew up in the area and knew the 
terrain well. They waited in in concealed positions flanking the road, then suddenly attacked with 
mortars and sub-machine guns at one concentrated point. They then shifted fire about 300 feet to 
the right or left in order to seal a narrow segment of the road. Next their assault teams attacked 
foxholes, trucks, and tents with grenades and demolition teams targeted tank hatches, field 
kitchens, and mortar pits with explosives. Sharpshooters would remain on the edge and target 
any officers while reserve infantry then would try to widen the breaks in the Soviet column. JR-
57 mounted two to three of these operations simultaneously, targeting chokepoints along the 
                                                
140 Eloise and Paananen. The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-40, 18, 44; Jägerskiöld, Mannerheim: 
Marshal of Finland, 116; Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, 145-46. 
 69 
Soviet column. Only 350 soldiers were needed to close the road to an entire Soviet division.141 
These operations worked similarly to mottis, except that the mottis were monitored and kept in 
isolation while at Suomussalmi the Finns continued moving and sought to degrade the 163rd 
Division’s numerical advantage and create massive roadblocks to hinder future movement. This 
meant that the offensive targeted tactics that were so successful for the Finns with their mottis in 
this case did not suffer from the strategic disadvantage of tying up as many troops.  
Between 13 and 22 December the Finns and Soviets skirmished and the Finns continued 
to launch ski raids on Soviet positions in order to increase pressure. Around 20 percent of Soviet 
forces became battle and frostbite casualties, but no significant progress occurred. JR-57 
received reinforcements of a battalion of ski troopers, an infantry battalion, two batteries, and 
two bofors antitank guns and became the newly designated Finnish 9th Division. On 23 
December the 44th Soviet Division advanced to aid the 163rd Division, but two Finnish ski 
detachments ambushed two locations, killing dozens of men and horses and destroyed several 
trucks and a field kitchen. The Finns continued to conduct random sniper attacks and mortar 
barrages to ruin hot meals and sleep for the 44th Division, which halted its advance despite no 
serious injury to the unit.142 The Finnish decision to attack sources of comfort was a targeted 
tactic that degraded Soviet morale and helped halt any forward advance of the 44th Division 
without significant engagement. In addition, the Finns’ mobility made the 9th Division seem 
much larger than in reality and the trees protected troops from aerial attack. These targeted 
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tactics decreased vulnerabilities and employed their meager resources to extinguish the 44th 
Division’s will to fight.  
On 27 December the 9th Division launched an attack to destroy the 163rd Division 
sending one unit a mile outside of Suomussalmi on the road, one into Suomussalmi where 
Soviets took refuge in non-burned homes, and several diversionary companies to flank the road 
and target fleeing Soviets. Soviet resistance broke on 28 December after attacks from multiple 
directions.  This multi-fronted offensive used targeted tactics that reduced vulnerabilities since 
the Soviets could not target their enemy. The cold and hungry Soviets tried to flee, but the Finns 
placed barbed wire and tank traps into the ice on Kiantajärvi Lake. In addition, the Soviets were 
still wearing khaki uniforms, rendering them easy targets on the open ice. Over 5,000 Soviets 
were killed and the 163rd Division was destroyed.143 
The 44th Division was located only six miles away from this battle, stretched over 20 
miles along the road leading from Suomussalmi. The Finns proceeded to break the 44th Division 
into seven distinct mottis in the beginning of January, using combat engineers to blow up trees, 
plant mines, and create roadblocks to ensure the partitions. Finnish snipers tied themselves up in 
trees in their snow camouflage and waited to target Soviet officers, a targeted tactical decision to 
remove Soviet leadership. The Soviets called them “cuckoos” and feared their unpredictable and 
deadly shots. 144 Finnish sniper Simo Häyhä was dubbed “White Death” and killed a confirmed 
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505 soldiers, but his unofficial kill count is up to 700. The Red Army placed a price on his head 
before he was put in a coma after being shot in the head.145 
The Finns established a rotation for patrols and small raids to keep continual pressure on 
the 44th Division. The Finns built dugouts to provide warmth and rest for themselves while 
intentionally targeting anything that provided warmth or nutrition for the Red Army. The Soviet 
Air Force did not provide sufficient supplies and by 8 January the last of organized Soviet 
resistance broke. Again, the Finns’ mobility and decision to target sources of comfort destroyed 
the Red Army’s ability to fight effectively. Over 28,500 Soviets died in the Battle of 
Suomussalmi and the Finns destroyed 43 tanks and 270 other vehicles while acquiring 48 pieces 
of artillery, 600 rifles, 300 submachine guns, and some mortars and working tanks. The Finnish 
Army suffered 900 fatalities and 1,770 wounded in the most decisive of the battles in the 
northern forests that demonstrates that targeted offensive tactics can make a significant 
difference in asymmetrical warfare.146 
 
 Phase Two, 8 January – 1 February 1940: The January Lull 
General Secretary Stalin intended to celebrate his 60th birthday on 18 December with a 
Finnish victory, but the two-week war instead continued into its second month. In early January, 
Hella Wuolijoki, a Finnish Communist, connected with her acquaintance Alexandra Kollontay, 
the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Sweden. The Finnish Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner had 
previously tried and failed to open talks about a negotiated settlement to end the war with the 
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Soviet Union, but these two women arranged a meeting on 10 January to discuss settlement 
possibilities for their respective governments, illustrating the role of the bargaining theory in 
warfare. The war had become much bigger than General Secretary Stalin intended and he wished 
to have his troops ready for potential war with other states and also hoped to end the war before 
any Anglo-French intervention in Finland could become a reality. However, he also hoped to end 
the war without losing too much face, so felt he could not end the war too quickly or without 
significant gains.147  
In January the Red Army halted any major assaults to restructure troops and leadership. 
General Marshal Semyon Timoshenko (1895-1970)148 was placed in command with a new focus 
to win the Winter War. He reorganized the Red Army and concentrated most resources to 
General Meretskov in the southern Isthmus in order to break the Mannerheim Line. General 
Meretskov’s troops were concentrated over 10 miles between Summa and the Lähde road on the 
southern section of the Mannerheim Line with nine infantry divisions, five tank brigades, one 
machine-gun division, and enough artillery that each mile had around 80 guns. General 
Timoshenko planned gradually escalating aerial bombardments that suddenly increased 
preceding an infantry and tank attack. This plan of attack was similar to all other attacks on the 
Mannerheim Line except for the increased concentration of firepower on this sector as well as 
the extent of the artillery barrage. He hoped this cumulative attack would wear the Finns and 
their meager resources down until the Red Army broke through the Line. The Soviets mobilized 
a totally of 47 divisions of 600,000 troops ready to attack and large amounts of ammunition that 
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would widen the break until the Finns surrendered.149 This strategy used nontargeted tactics that 
relied on strength of numbers and amount of firepower. 
The Red Army also received new equipment to augment their capabilities. Soviet troops 
and tanks on the front lines were issued snow camouflage and forward observers given new 
radios to communicate targets to artillery. With their superior air power, they could also protect 
balloons that relayed specific Finnish positions. The Soviets developed flame-throwing vehicles 
that spewed naphtha onto the Finns as well. However, the Finns learned that if they covered their 
faces, only their snowsuits would become scorched and they could quickly run through these 
flames unharmed. The only change the Finns could afford was to replace the 5th Division with 
the 6th and General Mannerheim renamed the other divisions in an effort to make the Soviets 
believe they were facing all fresh troops.150 
 
 Phase Three, 1 February 1940 – 13 March 1940: The February Offensive 
On 1 February 1940, 1,500 Soviet planes flew over Summa and dropped 300,000 shells 
in an intense carpet-bombing attack. The Finnish fortifications were well camouflaged, but the 
Soviets noticed any hint of smoke so the Finns only operated their field kitchens by night. 
During any lull in the bombing campaign, every Finnish soldier was required to quickly make 
repairs to damaged dugouts and telephone cables, aid wounded soldiers, or gather new supplies. 
On 5 February one Finnish regiment lost its commander three times as 400 shells fell each 
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minute on Summa. The Finnish pillboxes lacked deep foundations, thick walls, or enough steel 
to hold well under prolonged artillery fire, and since the pillboxes were positioned far apart, they 
could not aid one another well if directly attacked.  
Soviet tanks also improved their tank and infantry coordination and tactics. The Finns 
could use their Maxim guns in deadly attacks on infantry, but these guns had little impact on 
tanks. Since the Finns had few antitank guns to effectively destroy the tanks, when possible the 
tankers began parking directly in front of Maxim gun ports in the pillboxes. This protected the 
Soviet infantry so they could get close to the pillboxes without undergoing such intense fire, 
which forced the Finns to leave their pillboxes and fight exposed. This coordination also allowed 
the Soviet infantry to protect their tanks by obstructing Finnish attempts to use Molotov 
Cocktails or grenades to dismantle the tanks. This targeted tactic by the Soviets hurt the Finns 
ability to fight while simultaneously diminishing the Soviets’ own vulnerabilities. It focused on 
negating the Finns’ strengths and forced the Finns out of their protected strongholds into the 
open, which devastated their ability to hold their positions.151    
However, after 11 days of fighting, the Mannerheim Line held. By 7 February the Finns 
destroyed around 90 tanks and killed thousands of Soviets; soldiers were forced to climb over 
piles of their comrades in order to reach Finnish strong points. The Soviets attempted to take out 
Finnish coastal batteries that had turned inland against the tanks, but were killed before any 
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soldiers could get closer enough. North on Lake Ladoga, coastal batteries killed 2,500 Soviet 
infantry in similar attacks.152  
On 12 February General Timoshenko achieved his objective and the Mannerheim Line 
was breached on the Lähde Road. On the 12th alone the Finns suffered 1,200 casualties, an 
amount that the Red Army could endure multiplied by 10. Finnish command did not immediately 
recognize the significance of the breach in the Mannerheim Line due to broken communications. 
In addition, the line had been breached before in multiple places but always retaken through 
counterattacks in the night. However, by the 13th the breach on Lähde Road had not been retaken 
and the Soviets pushed the Finns behind Lake Summajrävi.  
However, the rest of the Mannerheim Line stood even though the Red Army attacked 
Taipale with five regiments and 50,000 shells on 13 February. General Mannerheim knew that 
the longer the Finns held on, the better their bargaining position would be in negotiations with 
the Soviets, but ordered a retreat back to the Intermediate Line on the 18th as the Soviets punched 
through more locations. On the 23rd the Soviets managed to take out the deadly coastal batteries 
and set up a new offshore position, creating additional pressure. By the 24th the Soviets were 
close enough to Viipuri to target communications with their artillery and the Intermediate Line 
was in danger of falling. Most of the Finnish forces retreated to the Rear Line by 28 February 
when General Timoshenko launched a massive assault on the Intermediary line and found it 
unguarded. On 2 March the Finns opened the Saimaa Canal northeast of Viipuri to slow down 
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the Soviet advance, a targeted attempt to hinder the Soviets’ ability to fight. However, the Red 
Army continued forward, wading through three feet to chin-level water and towing the tanks.153 
On 5 March Commissar Molotov recorded his fear of foreign intervention; the Soviets 
knew that France and England had prepared a plan to send 100,000 troops to aid the Finns. 
However, this Anglo-French force needed passageway through Norway and Sweden, which was 
not offered. Neither Norway nor Sweden wanted to give up their neutrality and align themselves 
against any of the great powers. In addition, Finland never made a formal request for aid because 
they knew suspected their military could not last long enough for the tenuous Anglo-French aid 
to arrive.154 However, on 6 March a peace delegation between Finland and the Soviets began the 
final negotiations for a settlement to end the war.  
The final Soviet offensive occurred on 4 to 9 March, creating military pressure on 
diplomatic negotiations as the Red Army engaged the reserves and threatened the rear of the 
troops on the Isthmus. Thirty Soviet divisions attacked the Rear Line with over 1,200 armored 
vehicles and 2,000 aircraft. The Finns held their positions but were slowly running out of 
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artillery. The Mannerheim Line was disintegrating but scattered resistance kept Viipuri from 
Soviet occupation.155 
On 12 March negotiations concluded and the war officially ended at 11am on 13 March 
after 105 days of fighting. At 10:45am the Soviets launched one last assault with no strategic 
objective, classifying itself as a nontargeted attack. However, fifteen minutes later the nearly 
constant artillery, armor, and infantry attacks ended after a month of little relief. Finland lost the 
Karelian Isthmus, some of their coastline, the Rybachi Peninsula, and some of Karelia north of 
Lake Ladoga, totaling around 25,000 square miles.156 The Red Army lost around 1,000 aircraft 
of the original 3,000 as well as around 2,000 of the original 3,000 tanks. Half of the Soviet 
Union’s Europe and Western Siberia divisions were mobilized to fight, 110 divisions, with 1.2 
million Soviet soldiers eventually deployed. The official casualty count for the Soviets equaled 
48,745 killed and 159,000 wounded; however, other estimates place the numbers at over 200,000 
killed and 300,000 wounded, which is about a 60 percent casualty rate with around 5,000 Soviet 
casualties a day.157 The Finns began the war with 300,000 soldiers with around 25,000 killed and 
43,000 wounded, a casualty rate of around 23 percent.158  
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The Winter War clearly demonstrates the power of targeted tactics, particularly in 
gaining a more advantageous bargaining theory. The Soviets relied on massed frontal assaults 
and overwhelming firepower, although targeting communications and parking tanks in front of 
firing ports were both important targeted tactics that aided the Red Army’s strategic goals. The 
Soviets intended a maneuver strategy, which lends itself well to targeted tactics, but the Soviets’ 
tactics in reality were largely nontargeted and their strategy shifted to a strategy of attrition. 
Although the Soviets out-resourced the Finns by far, they did not achieve a swift nor complete 
victory. However, their reckless use of resources did spur modernization that manifest in 
Operation Barbarossa with better camouflage, equipment, and tactics.159 
The Finnish Army had the advantage of defending their homeland; they were well trained 
in winter combat, knew their territory, and were usually on the defense. However, their tactics 
played an enormous role in their military successes, especially in the northern forests where the 
Finns were often on the offensive and destroyed whole Soviet divisions. Although the Finns had 
far fewer troops and resources, they used targeted tactics that concentrated resources on focused 
attacks that destroyed the Soviets ability to fight. The Finns mobility was a huge asset that 
provided cover as well as opportunity to use their resources where necessary. The Finns targeted 
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officers and tanks in order to mitigate the Soviet’s strengths as well as use Finnish resources 
where they had the biggest impact.160 These targeted tactics made a significant difference in the 
outcome of this war; although the Soviets expected Finland to fall easily to Soviet control, the 
Finns fought effectively with far fewer resources to maintain the integrity of their homeland. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
Tactics are only one piece of the complex system of warfare and cannot determine war 
outcomes, but tactics also play far too important a role to relegate as only an extension of 
strategy. Effective tactics are key to operational victories and the building blocks of a successful 
military campaign. Furthermore, targeted tactics employ resources efficiently in order to increase 
the bargaining advantage at a lower cost. These tactics disrupt enemy power by destroying 
critical vulnerabilities while defensively minimizing their own vulnerabilities.  
Military technology has become increasingly powerful and accurate, creating 
opportunities for targeted tactics to both protect vulnerabilities that were impossible to protect 
before as well as assault critical vulnerabilities that were impossible to attack earlier. Focusing 
on vulnerabilities both offensively and defensively is highly useful in order to undermine 
technological advantages. This relies on employment of resources more than possession of 
superior resources, making military might less important than military methods. A weaker force 
can still effectively engage a stronger enemy with targeted tactics that mitigate their 
disadvantages; targeted tactics render an enemy’s strength irrelevant instead of destroying it. 
The Second Boer War and the Winter War both demonstrate the potential of targeted 
tactics to make a marked difference in warfare. The Boers and the Finns both employed their 
smaller forces to disrupt enemy strengths, using targeted tactics that took advantage of enemy 
critical vulnerabilities. Although these case studies display the potential of targeted tactics, they 
cannot offer data on how often targeted tactics precede victory or in which military scenarios 
targeted tactics most often precede victory. Statistical analyses on the correlation of certain 
tactics and operational and strategic outcomes may offer additional information on the 
significance of targeted tactics in warfare. Further study may illuminate some of the complexities 
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that factor into war outcomes, adding to the scholarship on the mechanics of coercive 
negotiations, communication and commitment problems, and war termination. However, this 
thesis explores the theory behind the bargaining model of war and aptly demonstrates that tactics 
are significant to war outcomes and targeted tactics specifically hold the potential to increase the 
bargaining advantage at a lesser cost. 
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